Putin’s Cossacks. Just folklore – or business and politics?
OSW Point of View Number 68 December 2017 by Darczewska, Jolanta
6 8
P U T I N ’ S  C O S S A C K S
J u s t  f o l k l o r e  –  o r  b u s i n e s s  a n d  p o l i t i c s ?
J o l a n t a  d a r c z e w s k a  
NUMBER 68
WARSAW
dEcEMBER 2017
PUTIN’S COSSACKS
JUSt folkloRE – oR BUSiNESS ANd politicS?
Jolanta darczewska
© copyright by ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich
im. Marka karpia / centre for Eastern Studies
content editor
Adam Eberhardt
Editor
Anna Łabuszewska
co-operation
Halina kowalczyk, katarzyna kazimierska
translation
Jim todd
Graphic design
pARA-BUcH
dtp
GroupMedia
photograph on cover
Yarlander, shutterstock.com
pUBliSHER
Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia
centre for Eastern Studies
ul. koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, poland
phone: + 48 /22/ 525 80 00
fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40
osw.waw.pl
iSBN 978-83-65827-17-3
CONTENTS
tHESES /5
iNtRodUctioN /8
pREfAcE /11
I. tHE cHARActERiSticS of coSSAckdoM iN RUSSiA: 
BASic coNcEptS /12
1. The ‘Cossack state’ in modern Russia /12
2. The legal status of Cossackdom: the ‘Cossack state service’ /18
3. The ‘Cossack troops’ /23
4. The ‘Cossack component’ as a subject in education and state 
policy /31
II. tHE iNStitUtioNAliSAtioN of tHE coSSAck QUEStioN /43
1. The Kremlin’s strategic objectives /43
2. The institutional system for governing the Cossacks /50
SUMMARY /60
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
2/
20
17
5
 THESES
•	 The rhetoric of social engineering is repeatedly used in 
the Russian narration on the Cossack nation. This social 
engineering has been served by historically-rooted slo-
gans such as ‘the Cossack state’ and ‘registered Cossacks’. 
Terms such as ‘the Cossack state service’ and ‘the Cossack 
component’ are also functionally marked concepts. These 
appear in different contexts (the patriotic education of 
children and young people, the so-called civil society of 
Russia and its allegedly traditional conservative values, 
the creation of pro-defence attitudes, military reserves, 
a social factor combating the new threats posed by cul-
ture, information, illegal migration, etc.). Such concepts 
are the product of the Kremlin’s political technology – by 
shaping the military organisation of society and its con-
frontational attitude, it is not so much describing a real-
ity as creating one.
•	 The legal status of the modern Russian Cossack nation, which 
is also referred to as ‘neo-Cossackdom’, situates it within the 
framework of the ‘third sector’, i.e. non-commercial organi-
sations for the public benefit. This serves to emphasise its 
ability to organise itself. In fact, the Cossack military associ-
ations of today have little to do either with grassroots social 
initiatives or the non-governmental sectors, not to mention 
folklore or historical re-enactment associations. Their ba-
sic distinguishing features are their control by the Kremlin 
and the exchange of mutual benefits (they serve the Kremlin 
in exchange for concessions and contracts). This is the result 
of the Kremlin’s long-term policy, which has led to the con-
version of a spontaneous social movement into a movement 
controlled from the top down. 
•	 The favourable political situation at present (including the 
concessions the Kremlin has awarded the Cossacks in the 
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field of small businesses) is swelling the ranks of Cossack 
organisations with officers from the security and defence 
sectors who are leaving to the reserves (these are the roots 
of the predominant part of the neo-Cossack elite); radicals 
who are hungry for publicity and influence; and random 
individuals who are looking for ways to resolve their fi-
nancial problems. This has led to a change in motivation 
for the neo-Cossacks, especially the younger generation. 
For them, neo-Cossackdom has opened up a career path, 
because other options are blocked to them; it offers easier 
access to education and a stable income. 
•	 The Cossacks’ imprecise legal, political and social status 
allows the Kremlin  to assign them to different roles: from 
paramilitary organisations that are intended to educate 
young people in the spirit of patriotism and obedience, 
via volunteer fire departments and forest guards, police 
reserves preventing crime, combating terrorism, extrem-
ism and illegal migration, up to the role of irregular forces 
in information warfare and the fight against illegal bor-
der crossings, civil defence and territorial defence forces. 
Their permanent incorporation into the security and de-
fence system is guaranteed by their non-hierarchical or-
ganisational structure, the subordination of the Cossack 
troops to the President, as well as their ever-closer ap-
proximation to military standards. This is the main mes-
sage of the Strategy of policy towards the Russian Cossacks 
to 2020. 
•	 The implementation of this strategy is distinguished by 
the strongly bureaucratic system for managing the neo-
Cossacks’ development, as well as the Putin system’s ina-
bility to generate new projects. Those currently being im-
plemented under the banner of self-financing are merely 
replicating the old ones, preserving the pathologies of 
the Russian political & economic system. The Kremlin is 
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placing the burden of implementing its policy on the re-
gional authorities: the ‘self-financing’ of the Cossack or-
ganisations mainly consists of them concluding more or 
less profitable contracts, financed by the regions. 
•	 The new wave of Cossack-mania in Russia has coincided 
with a U-turn by the Kremlin away from its previously 
declared modernisation of Russia and in the direction of 
traditionalism, a transition which clearly accelerated af-
ter the events on the Maidan in Kiev. The Kremlin’s ally in 
its Cossack policy is the Orthodox Church, and their plat-
form for cooperation is the concept of ‘Orthodox Russian 
civilisation’, which among other things shapes an attitude 
of civil obedience. Both the state and the Church have ex-
ploited the image of Cossackdom as a ‘free state’, and they 
present the Cossacks as a model of civil society (which is 
also an argument for the existence in Russia of a subject 
society), as well as the bearers of conservative Orthodox 
values fighting the rot of the West, Islamic fundamental-
ism, the ‘fifth column’ and other threats to ‘Russian civi-
lisation’.
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INTRODUCTION
The roots of contemporary Cossack-mania in Russia
The	Russian	Cossacks	of	 today,	also	known	as	 the	neo-Cossacks	
(неоказачество),	 is	 in	 equal	 measure	 a	 product	 of	 a	 top-down	
Kremlin	policy	and	a	bottom-up	nationalist	movement.	Cossack	
nationalism	 is	 clearly	 linked	 to	a	 similar	 trend	dating	 from	 the	
beginning	of	the	20th	century1.	This	was	a	random	confluence	of	
modernisation	in	the	military	sphere,	conflict	between	the	centre	
and	the	periphery,	and	tensions	in	the	Russian	Empire	(Cossacks	
versus	 peasants;	 Cossacks	 versus	 non-Russians,	 the	 so-called	
инородцы).	 Two	 competing	 projects	 of	 Cossackdom	 emerged	 at	
that	time:	
1)	the	ethnic	variant,	with	the	emphasis	on	the	‘Cossack’	nation	as	
a	separate	ethnos,	having	the	right	to	autonomy	and	the	develop-
ment	of	their	own	culture;	and	
2)	the	imperial	variant,	depicting	the	Cossacks	as	a	pillar	of	the	
empire	and	the	great	Russian	people,	loyal	in	their	service	to	the	
state	and	its	Orthodox	values,	focused	on	strengthening	Russian	
statehood.
The	 disintegration	 of	 the	 empire,	 followed	 by	 the	 ‘de-Cossack-
isation’	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 the	 deportations	 under	 Stalin,	
completely	prevented	the	Cossacks	making	any	radical	demands	
for	many	decades,	but	did	not	uproot	these	desires	entirely.	The	
need	 to	 strengthen	 the	 Cossacks’	 newly	 conscious	 distinctive-
ness	and	‘ethnicity’	re-emerged	at	the	end	of	the	existence	of	the	
Soviet	 Union,	 when	 the	 Don,	 Terek	 and	 other	 ‘Republics’	 were	
1	 Б.	Корниенко,	Правый	и	национализма	идеология	Дон	(1909-1914),	Изда-
тельство	Европейского	университета	в	Санкт-Петербурге,	Sankt-Peters-
burg	2013.
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proclaimed,	 and	 (in	 November	 1991)	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 Union	 of	
Cossack	Republics	of	Southern	Russia	was	announced.
The	Russian	state’s	first	reactions	to	Cossack	separatism	were	cha-
otic,	and	more	symbolic	in	nature	than	anything	else.	In	July	1992	
the	Supreme	Council	passed	a	resolution	on	the	rehabilitation	of	
the	 Cossacks,	 supplementing	 an	 earlier	 resolution	 on	 the	 reha-
bilitation	of	the	repressed	peoples.	Meanwhile,	the	local	govern-
ments	 in	southern	Russia	exploited	ethnic	 tensions,	politicising	
the	Cossacks’	efforts	to	overcome	poverty	and	‘survive	in	the	hos-
tile	environment’	of	southern	Russia	(i.e.	by	stressing	their	sta-
tus	as	the	‘host’,	as	well	as	the	specific	laws	concerning	land	use)	
in	the	struggle	for	material	resources	and	power	in	the	regions.	
However,	the	decree	which	Boris	Yeltsin	signed	in	1995	on	a	state	
register	of	Cossack	associations	 in	 the	Russian	Federation	 testi-
fied	to	the	start	of	a	new	policy	towards	the	Cossacks:	it	defined	
not	only	the	challenge	facing	the	state,	but	also	 its	strategic	ob-
jectives.	Nevertheless,	 its	 implementation	was	only	undertaken	
after	the	political	changes	at	the	turn	of	the	century.	Conditions	
to	 change	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 Cossacks	
became	more	 favourable	 thanks	 to	 the	 centralisation	 of	 power,	
together	with	 a	 change	of	 emphasis	 in	 the	direction	 of	Russian	
imperial	 tradition.	The	 idea	 of	 a	 state	 register	 of	 Cossacks	 took	
concrete	shape	in	a	 law	on	the	state	service	of	Russian	Cossack-
dom,	which	Vladimir	Putin	signed	in	2005.	This	law	also	received	
a	solid	ideological	foundation:	the	ethnological	aspect	of	the	Cos-
sack	community	was	pushed	into	the	background,	and	its	mission	
of	state-building	was	emphasised.	The	Cossack	associations	were	
brought	out	of	deep-freeze,	reinforced	with	people	from	outside,	
and	pro-Kremlin	activists	were	placed	at	their	head.	However,	the	
policy	of	‘statising’	the	Cossack	community	did	not	abolish	the	di-
visions	existing	within	it.	A	more	radical,	though	poorly	heeded	
element	still	calls	for	the	recognition	of	the	Cossacks	as	a	nation,	
and	 seeks	 to	 restore	 their	 autonomy	 and	 direct	 democracy	 un-
der	the	rule	of	the	atamans.	However,	the	vast	majority	of	people	
who	declare	themselves	Cossacks	believe	that	such	demands	are	
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unrealistic	at	the	present	time;	they	participate	in	the	Kremlin’s	
projects	and	political	games,	counting	on	the	latter	to	protect	the	
group’s	interests.	Critics	treat	them	as	‘crossdressers’	who	support	
Putin.	Terms	such	as	‘a	new	type	of	Cossack’	or	‘the	neo-Cossacks’	
are	increasingly	being	used	to	describe	this	group.
The	current	wave	of	fashion	for	the	Cossacks	in	Russia	is	primar-
ily	 linked	with	the	function	assigned	to	 them	as	a	reserve	body	
for	the	Armed	Forces,	and	with	the	top-down	imposition	of	tradi-
tionalism.	Since	2012,	in	the	official	vision	they	have	become	the	
vanguard	of	an	‘organic’	Eurasian	civilisation	and	the	Orthodox	
conservative	values	of	the	‘Russian	world’.	The	‘Cossack	element’	
of	Kremlin	policy,	as	idealised	in	the	state’s	narrative,	is	presented	
as	an	anchor	of	security	and	defence	for	the	Russian	Federation,	
a	foundational	element	of	civil	society,	and	a	symbol	of	national	
endurance.	This	 policy	 has	 definitively	moved	 beyond	 the	 local	
context	of	southern	Russia,	although	in	propaganda	it	is	still	be-
ing	portrayed	as	a	process	of	‘the	rebirth	of	Cossackdom	within	its	
historical	borders’.
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PREFACE
The	process	referred	to	as	the	rebirth	of	Cossackdom	in	Russia	is	
complicated	and	has	not	been	 fully	 researched.	Among	Russian	
observers	 it	arouses	extreme	opinions:	some	see	 it	as	a	margin-
al	 social	phenomenon,	 a	kind	of	political	 folklore;	 others	 as	 the	
morally	and	physically	healthy	nucleus	of	the	nation,	the	basis	of	
modern	paramilitary	formations	defending	the	national	and	cul-
tural	borders	of	the	Russian	Federation,	as	well	as	a	basis	of	‘civil	
society’.	 Still	 others	 emphasise	 the	 opportunistic	 nature	 of	 the	
process,	based	on	the	influence	of	greedy	radicals	and	careerists	
looking	for	concessions	and	handouts	from	the	Kremlin.	
This	text	attempts	to	interpret	this	question	in	terms	of	a	socio-
political	 process	 which	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	 transformation	 of	
a	bottom-up,	spontaneous	movement	into	one	controlled	from	the	
top.	Regardless	of	this	fundamental	change,	the	Cossacks	(more	
specifically,	the	neo-Cossacks)	still	define	themselves	as	a	cultur-
al	and	historical	community,	with	the	aid	of	features	such	as	their	
defensive,	pro-Russian	state	mentality,	their	militarised	lifestyle	
and	 service	 to	 the	 state,	 their	Orthodox	 religion,	 and	 their	dis-
tinct	traditions	and	customs.	In	the	first	part	of	this	work,	the	of-
ficial	narrative	of	the	Cossacks	is	examined	through	the	prism	of	
certain	key	concepts.	The	concepts	discussed	(the	Cossack	state,	
the	 Cossack	 register,	 registered	 Cossackdom,	 the	 Cossack	 state	
service)	currently	bear	heavy	loads	of	misinformation,	as	a	result	
of	 their	being	 torn	away	 from	their	historical	 context	and	relo-
cated	in	today’s	Russian	realities.	
The	second	part	of	the	text	is	dedicated	to	the	Russian	Federation’s	
strategic	policy	objectives	regarding	neo-Cossackdom	and	the	or-
ganisational	system	which	has	been	set	up	to	implement	this	policy.	
The	text	concludes	with	a	list	of	the	functions	assigned	to	the	neo-
Cossacks,	 that	 is,	 the	Kremlin’s	 long-term	 interests	as	 linked	 to	
the	community.
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I. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF COSSACKDOM 
IN RUSSIA: BASIC CONCEPTS
1. The ‘Cossack state’ in modern Russia
The historical term ‘Cossack state’, which bears a certain 
propaganda load with it, fits well into the official narrative 
as it conceals the existence of neo-Cossackdom. At the same 
time, though, it causes a kind of cognitive dissonance: the 
anachronistic Cossack community is portrayed as a symbol 
of freedom on the one hand, and on the other as a pillar of 
Russian ‘civil society’ which is distinguished by its service to 
the state and its identification with a militarised way of life. 
The concept of the ‘Cossack state’ remains obscure, something 
to which the various legal solutions have contributed. The 
Cossack state service today includes both the so-called ‘na-
tive-born’ Cossacks and the ‘crossdressers’ (as people ‘work-
ing as Cossacks’ are defined), who have little in common with 
traditional Cossackdom and its idealised and exalted values. 
The process of Cossackdom’s rebirth in the reality of the Putin 
regime has led to its transformation into ‘neo-Cossackdom’, 
that is, an auxiliary part of the ruling power corporation, to 
which it is linked by its common corporate interests (service, 
business, politics). Even today, the division of the Cossacks 
into ethnic and imperial subgroups has not been overcome. 
Contrary	to	the	official	narrative,	which	deals	with	the	Cossacks	
as	a	bastion	of	healthy	traditionalism,	they	still	share	the	prob-
lems	of	Russian	society	as	a	whole:	passivity,	corruption,	atomisa-
tion,	mutual	distrust,	conformism,	susceptibility	to	manipulation	
by	the	government,	widespread	poverty	accompanied	by	strong	
stratification	 in	 terms	 of	 property	 ownership,	 unemployment,	
and	the	outflow	of	youth	from	their	traditional	places	of	residence.	
The	public	image	of	the	Cossacks,	especially	among	the	older	gen-
eration,	 is	 still	 burdened	 by	 the	 policy	 of	 their	 discreditation	
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during	the	Soviet	period,	according	to	which	the	Cossack	is	still	
a	barbarian	with	a	nahaika	(a	traditional	kind	of	whip),	an	alco-
holic,	a	xenophobe,	an	extremist,	an	enemy	of	progress.	
The	 grass-roots	movement,	which	was	 very	 lively	 in	 the	 1990s,	
improved	 its	 image	 by	 presenting	 itself	 as	 a	 ‘repressed	 ethnos’	
and	 ‘an	ethnos	of	 free	people’.	During	 the	collapse	of	 the	Soviet	
Union’s	socio-political	and	economic	regime,	which	was	accompa-
nied	by	a	wave	of	ethnic	tensions,	the	Cossacks	who	asserted	their	
rights	(in	a	xenophobic	manner)	to	their	historical	homelands	in	
the	south	of	Russia	were	tolerated,	and	even	somewhat	pampered	
by	the	local	administrations,	as	a	social	factor	preventing	ethnic	
crime	(by	Caucasian	organised-crime	groups),	Islamic	fundamen-
talism	and	extremism.	The	concept	of	the	‘Cossack	state’,	as	it	was	
then	 semi-officially	 introduced	 into	 circulation,	 was	 willingly	
taken	up	by	the	Cossacks	themselves,	who	treated	it	as	synony-
mous	with	the	historical	 ‘free	Cossack	state’,	and	as	a	substitute	
for	ethnicity.	Paradoxically,	 this	 concept	 (albeit	understood	dif-
ferently,	as	a	pro-state	and	defensive	mentality)	was	reinforced	
by	regional	officials,	and	also	entered	the	political	lexicon	of	the	
federal	bureaucracy,	which	declared	its	support	for	the	rebirth	of	
Cossackdom	in	Russia.
The	current	popularity	of	this	term	is	based	both	on	its	direct	link	
to	 the	 imperial	 tradition,	 and	 on	 the	 obfuscation	 of	 those	 of	 its	
historical	 referents	which	do	not	fit	 into	contemporary	Russian	
reality.	Historically,	‘Cossackdom’	refers	primarily	to	a	way	of	or-
ganising	social	life	on	a	separate	territory	on	the	basis	of	military	
democracy,	with	the	chieftain	(ataman/hetman)	being	chosen	in	
a	free	election.	As	a	borderland	community	between	the	old	Pol-
ish	Republic	and	the	Principality	of	Moscow,	the	Cossacks	in	fact	
lived	outside	the	state	societies	of	the	time;	they	were	only	linked	
to	the	states	of	Poland	and	Moscow	by	the	Cossack	registry	sys-
tem,	which	 guaranteed	 the	 Cossacks	 regular	 pay	 in	 return	 for	
their	participation	in	the	wars	of	that	time.	Cossack	units,	which	
in	the	days	of	the	Russian	Empire	were	organised	into	11	‘Cossack	
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troops’,	i.e.	11	separate	territorial-military	structures,	participat-
ed	 in	the	conquest	and	colonisation	of	 the	empire’s	new	territo-
ries,	and	also	guarded	 its	borders	 in	 the	Caucasus,	Central	Asia	
and	the	Far	East.
The	historical	 terms	 ‘Cossack	state’	and	 ‘registered	Cossackdom’	
as	used	today,	which	have	been	borrowed	from	the	terminology	of	
the	First	Polish	Republic	and	taken	out	of	their	historical	context,	
contain	a	 sizable	burden	of	misinformation.	One	abuse	of	 these	
terms,	 for	example,	 involves	 the	discussion	about	the	rebirth	of	
Russian	 Cossackdom	 in	 its	 historical	 homelands.	These	 ‘home-
lands’	 were	 mostly	 located	 on	 the	 territory	 of	 today’s	 Ukraine	
and	Kazakhstan,	whereas	Cossacks	have	now	appeared	in	places	
where	they	had	not	previously	been:	in	the	central	part	of	Russia	
(in	Moscow,	they	have	exchanged	their	horses	for	motorcycles),	in	
Karelia	and	Kaliningrad;	 in	fact,	they	are	represented	in	all	the	
military	districts	and	most	of	the	federal	entities	of	the	Russian	
Federation,	as	well	as	in	Russian-occupied	Crimea2.
2	 The	Crimean	Cossack	Circle	(okrug)	appeared	in	2015	(Российская газета – 	
Крым,	4	June	2015).	It	was	based	on	the	Crimean	hundred	of	the	Terek	Troops,	
which	had	operated	for	years	under	the	direction	of	Vadim	Ilovchenko	(the	
local	press	named	the	circle	as	the	Crimean	Troops	and	Ilovchenko	as	its	ata-
man).	The	hundred	took	an	active	part	in	the	Russian	separatist	movement	
in	Crimea	as	well	as	the	so-called	Crimean	spring.	The	formal	registration	
of	this	circle	has	still	not	been	completed,	as	the	Crimean	Cossacks	are	still	
undergoing	detailed	examination	by	the	FSB	and	the	Interior	Ministry	with	
regard	to	their	criminal	record.	
The	association	of	 the	Cossacks	of	Karelia	was	registered	 in	2012.	The	re-
gional	 authorities	 have	 adapted	 their	 laws	 to	 federal	 legislation	 (https://
mustoi.ru/kazachestvu-zaxotelos-v-karelii-gosudarstvennuyu-podder-
zhku/;	http://www.gov.karelia.ru/gov/News/2017/05/0503_16.html).	The	
explanatory	memorandum	to	 the	regional	 law	on	the	Cossacks	 in	 the	Re-
public	of	Karelia	states:	“The	Cossack’s	experience	will	help	to	solve	many	
problems	 related	 to	 the	 security	 of	 the	 region,	 the	 protection	 of	 borders,	
improving	the	criminal-pathological	situation,	and	will	improve	the	socio-
economic	stability	of	the	region.”
The	 social	 Baltic	 Cossack	Associations	 group,	which	 operated	 in	Kalinin-
grad	as	of	2015,	has	become	the	registered	Baltic	Individual	Cossack	Circle.	
Its	ataman	Maksim	Buga	is	trying	to	build	up	the	image	of	the	‘Baltic	Cos-
sack	troops’	as	an	important	power	structure	in	the	Kaliningrad	region,	and	
has	announced	their	close	cooperation	with	the	army	and	police.	Buga	par-
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According	to	different	estimates	there	are	between	2	and	7	million	
Cossacks	 in	Russia.	The	discrepancy	 is	 perpetuated	by	 the	Cos-
sacks	themselves,	as	well	as	by	the	Kremlin’s	official	propaganda:	
by	highlighting	the	scale	of	the	phenomenon,	the	magic	of	num-
bers	is	intended	to	strengthen	and	promote	the	idea	of	Cossack-
dom.	Contrary	to	the	‘ethnicity’	of	the	Cossacks	propagated	by	the	
atamans3,	who	conducted	boisterous	campaigns	before	every	cen-
sus	to	encourage	the	population	of	southern	Russia	to	grant	them	
‘Cossack	nationality’,	their	ethnic	identity	remains	poor.	During	
the	 2002	 census,	 140,000	people	 reported	 ‘Cossack	nationality’;	
in	the	next	census	in	2010,	the	figure	was	only	67,000.	The	vast	
majority	of	Cossacks	are	concentrated	in	the	Rostov	oblast.	In	ad-
dition,	the	results	of	the	2010	census	highlighted	the	artificial	and	
‘delicate’	nature	of	the	Cossack	question.	According	to	the	adopt-
ed	methodology,	 the	 ‘Cossacks’	were	treated	as	an	ethnographic	
group	of	the	Russian	ethnos.	The	figure	included	respondents	who	
in	addition	to	‘Cossack	nationality’	gave	the	Russian	language	as	
their	mother	tongue.	If	a	Cossack	gave	Ukrainian	as	his	native	lan-
guage,	he	was	automatically	assigned	to	the	Ukrainian	minority.	
As	a	result,	for	example	in	the	Krasnodar	krai,	which	is	the	nomi-
nal	 home	 territory	 of	 the	 ‘canonical’	 Kuban	 Troops,	 compared	
to	 Russians	 (4,522,962	 people,	 88.25%	 of	 the	 total	 population),	
Armenians	(281,680	people,	5.5%)	and	Ukrainians	(83,746	people,	
1.63%),	‘Cossacks’	are	a	marginal	group	(5899	people,	0.1%)4.	In	ad-
dition,	according	to	the	official	statistics,	53%	of	Cossacks	are	city	
ticipated	in	the	events	in	Crimea	in	2014	along	with	seven	Baltic	Cossacks	
(see	http://lawinrussia.ru/content/baltiyskoe-kazachestvo-perezhilo-no-
voe-rozhdenie).
3	 The	nationality	of	 ‘Cossack’	appeared	under	 the	 ‘nationality’	heading	on	
the	census	forms	at	the	initiative	of	Viktor	Vodolatsky,	ataman	of	the	Don	
Troops.	There	was	a	self-serving	aspect	to	this	demand:	the	atamans	counted	
on	grants	from	the	federal	budget	which	were	given	to	official	minorities.	
They	enthusiastically	drew	upon	the	example	of	the	Volga	Germans,	who	
at	that	time	were	being	given	special	favours	by	the	government	because	of	
their	mass	emigration	to	West	Germany.
4	 Д.	Куренов,	Сколько	на	самом	деле	казаков	в	России	и	на	Кубани,		https://
www.yuga.ru/articles/society/7524.html
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
2/
20
17
16
dwellers5,	which	also	calls	the	revival	of	Cossack	traditions	into	
question,	 as	 their	 natural	 habitats	were	 the	 stanitsa	 (campsite)	
and	the	hutor	(farmstead).
The	distinguishing	 factor	of	 the	 ‘neo-Cossack’	 is	not	ethnic,	but	
cultural	(traditional	clothes,	Orthodox	religion,	rich	folklore,	tra-
ditions,	military	mentality).	The	Kremlin’s	policy	consciously	ob-
fuscates	the	Cossacks’	ethnic	ambitions	in	any	case,	treating	them	
as	a	healthy	component	of	 the	Russian	people.	The	traditionally	
pro-state	nationalism	and	Orthodox	religion	of	the	Cossacks	has	
today	become	part	of	‘Russian	conservatism’	and	‘Orthodox	civi-
lisation’;	thus	the	‘Cossack	question’	has	become	part	of	the	‘Rus-
sian	 question’.	 According	 to	 the	 methodological	 interpretation	
of	the	First	Cossack	University,	“Formally,	a	Cossack	may	be	any	
citizen	of	the	Russian	Federation	who	identifies	with	Cossackdom	
and	its	specific	way	of	life,	who	practices	its	traditions	and	ethical	
principles”6.	The	legal	definition	in	the	federal	law	from	2005	on	
the	state	service	of	Russian	Cossackdom	is	equally	vague;	it	states	
that	“Russian	Cossacks	are	c	itizens	of	the	Russian	Federation	who	
are	members	of	Cossack	associations”7.	According	to	the	govern-
ment’s	Federal	Agency	for	Nationality	Affairs8	“Cossacks	are	not	
a	nationality,	but	a	cultural-historical	community	 (...);	Kalmyks	
and	Buryats	 have	 joined	Cossackdom	without	 renouncing	 their	
nationality”.	The	Agency	estimates	that	modern	Russian	Cossacks	
5	 In	large	cities	the	Cossacks	prefer	not	to	openly	display	their	ethnic	dis-
tinctiveness:	during	the	2010	census	only	609	Muscovites	declared	Cossack	
nationality,	and	in	St.	Petersburg	the	figure	was	34.	See	Н.	Кучеров,	Где	
живут	казаки?,		http://kazak-center.ru/publ/novosti_kazak_inform/rossi-
jskoe_kazachestvo/gde_zhivut_kazaki/153-1-0-1246
6	 Казачий	компонент	в	высшем	образовании,	on	the	website	of	the	Moscow	
University	of	Technology	and	Management:	http://mgutm.ru/kazachestvo/
formation.php
7	 Федеральный	закон	от	5	декабря	2005	г.	N	154-ФЗ	О	государственной	
службе	российского	казачества,	Российская Газета,	8	December	2005,	
https://rg.ru/2005/12/08/kazachestvo.html
8	 Агентство	по	делам	национальностей:	за	последние	6	лет	число	казаков	
в	России	выросло	в	4	раза,	https://www.currenttime.tv/a/28156818.html
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include	over	forty	nationalities,	and	over	the	past	six	years	their	
numbers	have	quadrupled.
The	 above-mentioned	 Agency	 has	 confirmed	 that	 ‘neo-Cossack-
dom’	(the	new	Cossack	community)	is	today	made	up	of	both	de-
scendants	of	the	Cossacks	of	the	Russian	Empire	and	citizens	of	
the	Russian	Federation,	who	have	“joined	it”.	The	reasons	for	do-
ing	so	are	various:	some	are	governed	by	a	romantic	image	of	Cos-
sackdom;	others	have	come	to	expect	concessions	and	privileges	
from	the	state;	still	others	are	looking	for	solutions	to	their	finan-
cial	 problems	 through	 the	 possibility	 of	 additional	 income.	The	
statutory	conditions	for	admission	to	the	military	Cossack	associ-
ations	are	not	prohibitive:	it	is	required	to	submit	an	application,	
testify	to	the	Orthodox	religion,	to	be	without	a	criminal	record,	
undergo	a	three-month	trial	period,	and	then	there	is	a	collegial	
decision	by	the	General	Assembly,	i.e.	the	‘Cossack	circle’.	Women	
may	also	join	the	associations9,	although	this	is	in	violation	of	the	
Cossacks’	traditional	social	model.	The	predominant	part	of	their	
elite	is	derived	from	the	ministries	of	force.	This	state	of	affairs	is	
favoured	by	law:	the	rank	of	Cossack	can	be	assigned	to	persons	
serving	or	in	the	reserve	of	the	Ministry	of	Defence,	the	Minis-
try	of	Internal	Affairs,	the	Federal	Security	Service,	the	Federal	
Security	Service,	the	bodies	of	justice	and	the	public	prosecutor’s	
office.	 For	 native-born	 Cossacks,	 these	 ‘non-natives’	 are	 treated	
ironically	as	‘crypto-Cossacks’,	‘the	self-proclaimed’,	‘crossdress-
ers’.	According	 to	Oleg	Gubenko10,	 a	 representative	of	 the	Terek	
Cossacks,	descendants	of	native-born	Cossacks	now	make	up	no	
more	 than	30%	of	 the	Cossack	organisations’	members.	Radical	
representatives	of	the	nationalist-ethnic	current	commonly	jux-
tapose	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘Cossack’	with	 the	 term	 ‘Cossackdom’,	 i.e.	
the	‘real	Cossack	ethnos’,	in	contrast	with	the	‘crossdressers’	who	
9	 Р.	Минеев,	«Не только махать шашкой». Атаман	рассказал	о	жизни	
современного	казачества,	http://www.krsk.aif.ru/society/ataman_pav-
el_artamonov_zachem_kazakam_nuzhen_zakon
10	 After	Государство	и	казачество,	Казачество Москвы,	28	August	2016,	http://
казачествомосквы.рф/news/gosudarstvo_i_kazachestvo/2016-08-28-1184
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favour	the	imperial	current	(calling	the	latter	‘имперцы’,	that	is,	
supporters	of	the	neo-imperial	ideology)11.
2. The legal status of Cossackdom: the ‘Cossack state 
service’
Neo-Cossackdom has little in common with the ethos of a ‘free 
people’: its supposedly ‘bottom-up’ initiatives are controlled 
from the Kremlin and subject to strict control. Moreover, 
crucial to the Kremlin are the Cossacks’ military/discipli-
nary features, which are covered by the term ‘Cossack state 
service’. This concept, which is of essential importance today 
in the official narrative, has supplanted previous considera-
tions on the revival and rehabilitation of the ‘Cossack nation’ 
in the public debate. In the face of the authorities’ increasing 
demands of this service, the Cossack organisations have not 
been and still are not able to recruit the necessary number of 
Cossacks to it. This has led to the Cossack associations rein-
forcing their ranks with representatives of the armed forces 
and other government departments of force who have been 
dismissed to the reserves, as well as random individuals (in-
cluding so-called freaks and radicals, often with criminal re-
cords), in a way which the current political situation favours. 
The legal regulations concerning the Cossack service have in-
troduced a division of the Cossacks into ‘registered’ and ‘un-
registered’ groups. 
The	 relevant	 legal	 definition	 is	 found	 in	Article	 5	 of	 the	 above-
mentioned	 act	 concerning	 the	 state	 service	 of	Russian	Cossack-
dom,	which	states	that	Cossacks	will	perform	their	military	ser-
vice	in	their	own	separate	units	of	the	armed	forces,	the	National	
Guard	troops,	and	in	the	FSB’s	border	troops.	In	accordance	with	
11	 See	М.	Струкова,	Казаки-семь	политических	трендов,	https://rusmoni-
tor.com/marina-strukova-kazaki-sem-politicheskikh-trendov.html
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this	regulation,	Cossack	state	service	includes	the	following	obli-
gations:
1)	 participation	 of	 Cossack	 associations	 in	 keeping	military	 re-
cords,	in	organising	the	military-patriotic	education	of	conscripts	
and	training	the	reservists;
2)	 participation	 in	 preventing	 crime	 and	 removing	 the	 conse-
quences	of	emergencies	and	natural	disasters,	 civil	and	 territo-
rial	defence;
3)	 participation	 in	 protecting	 public	 order,	 ecological	 and	 fire-
fighting	protection,	defending	the	state	border	and	acting	in	the	
fight	against	terrorism;
4)	other	activities	based	on	the	Cossack	associations’	agreements	
with	the	military	administrations,	the	federal	bodies	of	executive	
power	 and	 their	 territorial	 organs,	 and	also	with	 the	 executive	
authorities	of	entities	of	the	Russian	Federation	and	the	organs	of	
the	local	government	authorities.
In	practice,	Cossack	state	service	takes	many	forms	(military	ser-
vice	by	both	conscripted	and	contract	troops,	self-defence	units,	
sentries,	patrols,	volunteer	teams	for	security	at	mass	events,	and	
lastly	vice	squads	and	cyber-volunteers).	This	is	done	within	the	
community,	or	on	the	basis	of	contracts	between	the	federal	&	lo-
cal	 authorities	 and	members	 of	 the	 registered	 associations.	The	
procedure	 for	 transferring	 them	 to	 the	 state	 registry	 is	 deter-
mined	by	Article	6	of	the	above-mentioned	act.
The	problem	lies	not	only	in	the	fact	that,	according	to	the	applica-
ble	provisions,	the	Cossack	service	does	not	have	the	basic	attrib-
utes	of	state	service,	such	as	the	status	of	a	state	worker,	employ-
ment	contracts,	fixed	salaries	or	social	protection.	This	is	partially	
a	voluntary,	social	kind	of	service,	and	partially	contractual	with-
in	the	framework	of	the	Cossack	associations.	Such	difficulties	of	
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interpretation	 also	 arise	 from	 the	 legal	 status	 of	 these	 associa-
tions.	 In	 the	 civil	 code	 revised	 in	May	2014	 (Article	 123.15),	 the	
Cossack	associations	are	defined	as	“associations	of	citizens,	re-
corded	in	the	state	register,	formed	with	the	aim	of	maintaining	
the	traditional	lifestyle,	farming	and	culture	of	Russian	Cossack-
dom,	and	also	with	other	aims	as	provided	for	in	the	law	on	the	
state	service	of	Russian	Cossackdom,	which	voluntarily	and	in	the	
statutory	manner	have	taken	upon	themselves	obligations	in	the	
field	of	service	 to	 the	state	or	others.”	The	civil	code	unambigu-
ously	qualified	the	Cossack	associations	to	the	institutions	of	the	
so-called	Russian	‘third	sector’:	non-governmental	non-commer-
cial	organisations	(for	 the	public	benefit).	The	manner	 in	which	
they	were	 entered	 into	 the	 state	 register	 is	 determined	 by	 the	
regulations	of	the	Ministry	of	Justice,	which	maintains	this	reg-
ister.	Any	application	to	join	should	include	the	following	items:	
1)	 the	statutory	objectives	of	 the	organisation	 (the	maintenance	
of	the	traditional	lifestyle,	farming	and	customs	of	Cossackdom);	
2)	data	concerning	the	size	of	the	organisation’s	membership	(de-
pending	on	 the	 level:	 rural	and	hutor	 (farmstead)	organisations	
should	contain	at	least	10	members,	municipal	organisations	30,	
district-level	150,	oblast-level	500,	and	a	military	Cossack	associa-
tion	1000	members;	3)	the	obligation	of	the	association’s	members	
to	serve	the	state	and	others.
The	Cossacks’	legal	capacity	is	bound	to	the	state	register,	although	
this	does	not	mean	that	the	‘unregistered’	are	of	no	interest	to	the	
Russian	 authorities.	This	 is	 because	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 registry,	
many	other	organisations,	clearly	supported	and	entrusted	with	
tasks	by	the	Kremlin,	are	also	in	operation.	Many	of	these	–	such	
as	the	Union	of	Cossacks,	established	in	1990	(i.e.	still	in	the	Soviet	
period),	and	led	without	a	break	since	then	by	the	ataman	Pavel	
Zadorozhny	–	changed	 their	status	 to	registered	associations	 in	
2012	under	pressure	from	the	Kremlin.	Registered	and	social	Cos-
sack	associations	have	participated	on	an	equal	footing	in	military	
expeditions,	 and	have	performed	various	overt	and	covert	mis-
sions.	 In	2014,	Terek,	Kuban	and	Amur	Cossacks	 from	Belgorod	
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made	their	presence	in	Crimea	clearly	felt,	as	did	the	unregistered	
‘wolves’	hundreds’	led	by	Igor	Girkin	(a.k.a.	Strelkov)	and	the	local	
Crimean	Cossacks,	who	at	that	time	were	citizens	of	Ukraine.
One	spectacular	example	of	an	action	by	‘unregistered’	groups	is	
the	so-called	Cossack	National	Guard	of	the	Almighty	Don	Army	
under	ataman	Nikolai	Kozitsyn,	which	was	formed	in	April	2014	
to	support	the	Russian	war	against	Ukraine	in	the	Donbas.	Volun-
teers	led	by	him	occupied	the	towns	of	Antratsyt,	Severodonetsk	
and	others,	where	 they	“entered	at	 the	request	of	 their	Cossack	
brothers,	who	represent	80%	of	the	population,	and	where	there	
was	a	 threat	of	 a	 repetition	of	 the	events	of	 the	Maidan”12.	This	
body	came	into	conflict	with	the	authorities	of	the	Lugansk	and	
Donetsk	 ‘People’s	 Republics’,	 and	 discredited	 themselves	 among	
the	local	population	as	a	result	of	their	drunken	brawling,	and	at	
the	end	of	the	same	year	they	withdrew.	However,	Kozitsyn	still	
keeps	 the	Ukrainian	 community	 under	 psychological	 pressure,	
scaring	 them	with	 the	guard’s	 still	 growing	potential,	which	 is	
based	on	the	newly-created	districts	of	the	Almighty	Don	Army	in	
south-east	Ukraine	(Lugansk,	Donetsk,	Kharkov,	etc.)13.	 In	Janu-
ary	2017	he	announced	a	new	call-up	of	Cossack	volunteers	to	the	
so-called	Donetsk	People’s	Republic.	Ataman	Kozitsyn	is	a	knight	
of	28	state	orders,	 including	 the	Order	of	 the	Red	Standard	and	
the	Red	Star	 ‘For	Personal	Courage’	of	Peter	the	Great	and	Alex-
ander	Nevsky,	 and	also	has	 awards	 from	 the	Russian	Orthodox	
Church.	He	also	holds	the	rank	of	general	of	the	Cossack	troops,	
awarded	by	the	President	of	the	Russian	Federation.	He	has	had	
a	 typical	 career	 for	a	Cossack	general:	after	completing	 Interior	
Ministry	training	in	Kharkov	in	1985	he	worked	in	a	penal	colony.	
He	was	fired	for	professional	misconduct,	started	a	private	enter-
prise,	and	was	involved	in	the	renaissance	of	the	Don	Cossacks.	
12	 Атаман	Николай	Козицин	и	«Казачья	национальная	гвардия»,	http://
www.apn.ru/index.php?newsid=36029
13	 М.	Бондаренко,	Донские	казаки	готовятся	в	поход,	Независимая Газета,	
3	February	2017,	http://www.ng.ru/regions/2017-02-03/6_6920_kazaki.html
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He	participated	 in	 the	Transnistrian	 conflict	 (1992),	 and	 fought	
on	 the	side	of	 the	Serbian	 leader	Slobodan	Milošević,	as	well	as	
with	the	separatist	Abkhaz	and	Ossetian	forces	in	Georgia	(2008).	
He	operates	independently	of	the	registered	Don	Troops,	and	has	
openly	carried	out	missions	entrusted	him	by	the	Kremlin	(as	he	
has	stated,	he	is	subject	only	to	the	Lord	and	to	President	Putin).
Examples	can	also	be	given	of	cases	where	a	registered	group	has	
changed	its	status	to	unregistered.	Since	2014	the	Central	Cossack	
Association	 has	 been	 headed	 by	 the	 ataman	 Ivan	Mironov.	 His	
predecessor,	ataman	Valery	Nalimov,	currently	runs	the	Central	
Cossack	 Troops’	 Interregional	 Social	 Organisation,	 and	 is	 con-
tinuing	this	group’s	activities	in	the	Balkans.	At	his	initiative,	in	
2011	the	Saint	Sava’s	Cossack	Stanitsa	was	formed,	which	in	turn	
resulted	in	the	creation	in	2016	of	the	Balkan	Cossack	Army	based	
in	Kotor,	Montenegro,	assembling	26	Serbian	Cossack	organisa-
tions14.	Unregistered	Cossack	organisations	are	more	useful	when	
fulfilling	the	role	of	 ‘Russian	fifth	columns’,	as	they	can	camou-
flage	their	ties	with	the	Russian	state	more	effectively.
The	fluidity	of	the	boundary	between	registered	and	unregistered	
Cossacks	can	be	demonstrated	by	the	fate	of	the	Union	of	Cossack	
Troops	of	Russia	and	Abroad,	which	was	registered	in	Germany	
in	1993	and	led	from	the	outset	by	the	unregistered	Don	ataman	
Viktor	Ratiyev.	In	Russia,	this	international	organisation	was	del-
egalised	as	part	of	the	re-registration	of	Cossack	associations	or-
dered	in	2012;	its	assets	were	taken	over	by	an	association	led	by	
ataman	Viktor	Vodolatsky,	an	active	participant	in	the	Kremlin’s	
projects15.	This	new	group,	which	was	registered	by	the	Ministry	
14	 For	example,	see	Россия	создаёт	на	Балканах	русское	войско,	http://pol-
texpert.org/15763-rossiya-sozdaet-na-balkanah-russkoe-voisko;	 Russia’s	
Friends	Form	New	 ‘Cossack	Army’	 In	Balkans,	https://www.rferl.org/a/
balkans-russias-friends-form-new-cossack-army/28061110.html
15	 Viktor	Vodolatsky	is	the	former	ataman	of	the	Don	Troops,	a	former	deputy	
governor	of	Rostov	oblast,	a	member	of	United	Russia,	chairman	of	the	Duma	
committee	on	the	patriotic	education	of	children	and	young	people,	vice-
president	of	the	Duma	committee	for	the	CIS,	Eurasian	integration	and	com-
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of	Justice	in	December	2014,	adopted	the	name	of	the	Union	of	Mil-
itary	Cossacks	of	Russia	and	Abroad	(its	Russian	abbreviation	re-
mained	unchanged).	Officially	the	purpose	of	this	re-registration	
process	was	to	regulate	and	order	the	Cossack	world,	as	well	as	
the	functions	of	the	individual	associations.	However,	the	exam-
ple	of	this	one	organisation	clearly	shows	that	the	real	idea	was	to	
subject	the	Cossacks	in	Russia	and	abroad	to	closer	control,	mak-
ing	it	easier	for	the	Kremlin	to	carry	out	its	policies16.	
3. The ‘Cossack troops’
Assigning the Cossacks to all the roles they perform – from 
paramilitary organisations that deals with the patriotic 
(and Orthodox) education of young people, through the fire 
brigades, forest guards, crime prevention, the fights against 
terrorism and extremism, the protection of public facilities, 
the defence of state borders, as well as participation in the 
civil defence and territorial defence organisations – falls 
within the competence of the Cossack associations’ military 
staffs, which are currently being created or reconstructed. 
In the public space, these associations are called the ‘Cossack 
troops’. These so-called troops, which, by virtue of the dis-
cipline prevailing within them, could only conventionally 
be classified as irregular troops, are treated in the official 
narrative as a permanent element of Russia’s security and 
munication	with	compatriots	abroad,	a	member	of	the	Presidential	Council	
for	Interethnic	Relations,	and	also	holds	other	functions.
16	 The	main	statutory	task	of	this	organisation	is	to	work	with	foreign	Cossack	
associations	(it	is	officially	affiliated	with	Cossacks	from	43	countries).	Its	
First	Great	Krug	was	attended	by	representatives	of	the	Presidential	Admin-
stration,	of	the	Rossotrudnichestvo	agency,	the	Ministry	of	Civil	Defence	and	
Emergency	Situations,	the	Russian	Orthodox	Church,	as	well	as	Aleksandr	
Borodai,	the	first	Prime	Minister	of	the	so-called	Donetsk	People’s	Republic,	
which	proves	the	systemic	support	of	the	separatists.	The	agenda	covered	the	
Cossacks’	participation	in	the	preparation	for	mobilisation	of	the	Russian	
Federation’s	Armed	Forces.	(Союз	Казаков-Воинов	России	и	Зарубежья.	
Перезагрузка	 началась,	 http://kazak-center.ru/news/sojuz_kazakov_
voinov_rossii_i_zarubezhja_perezagruzka_nachalas/2015-02-19-2934).
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defence architecture. In fact, they are a form of territorial 
organisation for the Cossack associations. This is based on 
a principle of centralisation, that is, of the hierarchical sub-
ordination of the lower-level structures to the structures at 
the higher level. 
In Russia	 there	 are	 currently	 eleven	military	 Cossack	 societies	
(военные казачьи общества,	hereafter	VKO)	 in	operation;	 these	
are	 vertically	 structured	 associations	 of	 locally	 registered	 or-
ganisations	in	one	or	more	regions	(at	the	hutor,	stanitsa,	urban,	
district	and	oblast	levels),	with	the	supreme	ataman	at	the	top	of	
the	pyramid.	Each	lower-level	structure	is	controlled	by	a	higher-
level	staff.	By	a	1995	decree	from	President	Boris	Yeltsin,	to	create	
a	state	register	of	Cossack	associations	in	the	Russian	Federation,	
ten	VKOs	appeared	between	1996	and	1998.	The	last	one,	the	Cen-
tral	VKO,	was	created	by	President	Vladimir	Putin	in	Decree	No.	
574	from	2007.	As	was	announced	back	in	2012,	these	organisa-
tions	were	originally	to	have	been	merged	into	a	single	All-Rus-
sian	Military	Cossack	Association,	but	as	of	now	this	has	still	not	
been	 established.	These	 paramilitary	 associations,	 which	 draw	
upon	historical	 traditions	 and	 are	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 the	
Cossack	troops,	have	become	the	primary	platform	for	the	rela-
tionship	 between	 the	 state	 and	 Cossackdom.	 According	 to	 data	
from	2014,	they	include	506,000	Cossacks,	numbering	in	the	fol-
lowing	regions17:
•	 Kuban	–	146,000	(29%),
•	 Don	–	126,000	(25%),
•	 Central	–	75,000	(15%),
•	 Yenisei	–	66,000	(13%),
•	 Terek	–	30,000	(6%),
•	 Orenburg	–	25,000	(5%),
•	 Volga	–	14,000	(3%),
17	 The	journalist	Nikolai	Kucherov,	cited	above,	has	drawn	upon	data	from	the	
Federal	Agency	for	Nationalities'	Affairs.
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•	 Trans-Baikal	–	6000	(1%),
•	 Siberia	–	6000	(1%),
•	 Amur	–	6000	(1%),
•	 Irkutsk	–	4500	(1%).
The	 official	 data	 has	 been	 deliberately	 inflated.	These	numbers,	
as	 is	 apparent	 from	 statements	 by	 Nikolai	 Doluda,	 ataman	 of	
the	 Kuban	 Troops’	 VKO,	 cover	 both	 the	 Cossacks	 themselves	
and	their	families.	In	his	annual	report	from	December	2016,	he	
stated	that	the	formation	he	leads	numbers	48,557	Cossacks	(5392	
more	people	than	in	2015),	and	more	than	160,000	people	in	to-
tal,	 along	with	 their	 families18.	The	Kuban	VKO	 consists	 of	 555	
organisations,	 including	 9	 at	 oblast	 level,	 59	 district	 and	487	 at	
the	municipal,	stanitsa	and	hutor	levels.	Some	sources	have	high-
lighted	a	tendency	of	‘aging’	among	the	VKOs’	members,	resulting	
in	a	decline	in	their	numbers.	More	realistic	data	is	cited	by	the	
Kremlin	propagandist	Vladislav	Gulevich19,	who	(probably	while	
taking	the	age	criteria	into	consideration)	has	estimated	the	po-
tential	irregular	Cossack	service	at	around	300,000.	The	Cossacks	
themselves	are	responsible	 for	 this	 informational	chaos:	 for	ex-
ample,	the	Cossack	Informational-Analytical	Centre20	states	that	
the	programme	for	developing	the	state/public	partnership	with	
the	Russian	Cossacks	for	2017-2025	has	been	allocated	765	million	
roubles	(US$13m)	in	the	state	budget.	The	intended	result	of	this	is	
“an	increase	in	the	number	of	Cossack	military	association	mem-
bers	from	180,000	people	(2016)	to	206,000	by	the	year	2025.”
The	Cossack	military	associations,	which	are	obliged	to	keep	records	
and	provide	pre-conscription	training,	as	well	as	retraining	for	the	
18	 Казачьей	 милиции	 нужно	 будет	 выдать	 оружие	 –	 главный	 казак	
Кубани	Николай	Долуда,	http://krasnodarmedia.su/news/572269
19	 В.	Гулевич,	Казаки	выйдут	на	службу,	23	October	2016,	http://www.se-
godnia.ru/content/180892
20	 Вопросы	финансирования	казачества	на	федеральном	и	региональном	
уровнях,	http://kazak-center.ru/news/voprosy_finansirovanija_kazach-
estva_na_federalnom_i_regionalnom_urovnjakh/2016-12-03-3216
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reserves	of	the	Russian	Federation’s	Armed	Forces,	are	of	particu-
lar	interest	to	the	Kremlin.	In	fact,	they	are	subject	to	presidential	
jurisdiction:	 the	 President	 approves	 their	 statutes,	 appoints	 the	
atamans	and	gives	them	the	highest	ranks	(Cossack	generals)21.	The	
atamans	generally	come	from	the	ministries	of	force	(the	most	re-
cent	nominations	have	come	in	most	cases	from	the	Russian	Feder-
ation’s	Armed	Forces),	and	make	up	part	of	the	regional	authorities	
(as	a	rule	they	are	deputy	governors,	responsible	for	security	and	
defence	in	the	region).	For	example:	ataman	Doluda	of	the	Kuban	
Troops,	who	at	the	same	time	is	deputy	governor	of	the	Krasnodar	
krai,	oversees	issues	related	to	conscription,	the	military	records	of	
the	reserves,	civil	defence	and	territorial	defence.	In	his	spare	time,	
he	performs	marriages,	as	he	also	oversees	the	local	ZAGS	(Органы 
записи актов гражданского состояния,	the	equivalent	to	the	Civil	
Registry	Office).	It	is	difficult	to	see	this	system	as	being	a	fair	sub-
stitute	for	the	Cossacks’	previous	autonomy	and	democracy,	when	
the	ataman	was	elected	at	a	general	meeting	(krug),	although	for-
mally	the	custom	has	been	retained:	the	President	appoints	the	ata-
man	at	the	request	of	the	krug.	
The	mechanism	for	recruiting	the	elite	neo-Cossacks,	and	the	‘ci-
vilian’	functions	they	perform,	can	be	illustrated	by	the	following	
summary:
Ataman (degree) Previous professional career and current administrative function
Cossack General Ivan 
Mironov (Central Cos-
sack Troops)
Reserve FSB general; deputy governor 
of Samara oblast
Cossack Colonel Viktor 
Goncharov (Don Troops)
Professional soldier; deputy governor 
of Rostov oblast
21	 http://ввко.рф/legislation/orders-and-dispositions/225-polozhenie-o-po-
ryadke-prisvoeniya-kazachih-chinov-kazakam-volzhskogo-voyskovogo-
kazachego-obschestva.html
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Ataman (degree) Previous professional career and current administrative function
Cossack General Nikolai 
Doluda (Kuban Troops)
Professional soldier, deputy governor 
of Krasnodar krai
Cossack Colonel Gen-
nady Privalov (Siberian 
Army)
Professional soldier; head of the military 
administration of the Omsk oblast
Military starshyna Alek-
sandr Żurawski (Terek 
Troops)
Professional soldier; head of the committee 
for nationalities of the Stavropol krai
Cossack Colonel Yuri 
Ivanov (Volga Troops)
Former head of department in the Ministry 
of Civil Defence and Emergency Situations 
in the Samara oblast; head of the Ministry’s 
Supreme Board in the oblast
Cossack General Pavel 
Artamonov (Yenisei 
Troops)
Professional soldier: no further information 
available
Cossack Colonel Gen-
nady Chupin (Trans-
Baikal Troops)
Former prosecutor in Chita; deputy gover-
nor of the Trans-Baikal krai
Cossack General Nikolai 
Shakhov (Irkutsk 
Troops)
Professional soldier: advisor to the governor 
of the Irkutsk oblast
Cossack General 
Vladimir Romanov 
(Orenburg Troops)
Former commander of the Interior Troops 
of the Ural oblast; deputy governor of the 
Sverdlovsk oblast
Cossack Colonel 
Vladimir Stepanov 
(Amur Troops)
Police colonel, former head of prison service 
delegation in Khabarovsk krai, head of de-
partment for cooperation with Cossacks in 
the administration of Khabarovsk krai
In	 addition,	 the	 ‘Cossack	 troops’	 include	 the	 Independent	Baltic	
Cossack	District	in	Kaliningrad,	headed	by	the	military	starshyna	
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Maksim	Buga,	and	 the	 Independent	Northwest	Cossack	District	
based	 in	 St.	 Petersburg,	 led	 by	 the	Cossack	 colonel	Vitaly	Mar-
tynenko.	
Special	attention	surrounds	the	‘Don	Troops’	based	in	Rostov,	the	
‘Kubans’	(Krasnodar),	and	the	‘Central	Troops’	(Moscow)	because	
of	 their	 numbers,	 as	 well	 as	 their	 formal	 and	 informal	 duties.	
The	Don	military	association	owes	its	high	status	to	its	first	ata-
man	Viktor	Vodolatsky	(who	is	now	a	political	activist	in	United	
Russia);	the	Kubans	to	the	governor	of	the	Krasnodar	krai	Alek-
sandr	 Tkachov	 (now	 minister	 of	 agriculture),	 and	 the	 Central	
Troops	 to	 their	 proximity	 to	 the	Kremlin,	which	 counts	 on	 the	
Cossacks’	support	in	crisis	situations.	The	troops	are	covered	by	
the	patronage	of	 the	president,	as	well	as	 that	of	 local	adminis-
trations	(the	grants	for	Cossack	troops	come	out	of	local	budgets).	
The	lack	of	a	local	patron	resulted	in	a	decrease	in	the	numbers	of	
the	Terek	Troops’	VKO,	which	acquired	a	certain	notoriety	during	
the	Chechen	wars	because	of	 the	 ‘Yermolov	battalion’22.	 Its	par-
ticipation	in	the	Chechen	wars,	and	in	the	Ossetian/Ingush	con-
flict	on	the	side	of	the	Ossetians,	 led	to	this	VKO	being	expelled	
from	Chechnya	and	Ingushetia,	and	the	liquidation	of	its	district	
organisations	 (in	Grozny,	Sunzha,	etc.).	These	events,	as	well	as	
a	series	of	subsequent	schisms,	reduced	its	numbers	by	more	than	
half:	leaving	aside	the	reliability	of	the	data,	at	the	time	of	its	reg-
istration	in	the	1990s	it	included	70,000	Cossacks,	but	currently	
that	number	is	estimated	at	30,000.	
The	parades	of	the	‘Cossack	troops’	enjoy	considerable	public	es-
teem.	Spectacular	changes	of	 the	guard	are	 the	specialty	of	 the	
Kuban	 Troops’	 VKO.	 It	was	 also	 the	 only	 such	 group	 honoured	
by	 participation	 in	 the	 central	 victory	 parade	 in	 Moscow	 on	
9	May	2015,	albeit	for	mundane	reasons:	it	is	the	only	association	
22	 Yermolov	was	a	Cossack	ataman,	conqueror	of	the	Caucasus.	To	the	Cossacks	
this	name	had	overtones	of	propaganda,	and	the	Chechens	took	it	as	a	provo-
cation.	The	battalion	was	decimated	in	a	series	of	ambushes.
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maintaining	a	 special	honour	guard	which	provides	 the	setting	
for	state	and	church	celebrations,	both	in	Moscow	and	in	the	re-
gions.	The	Kuban	Cossacks’	 participation	 in	 the	 parade	was	 for	
propaganda	reasons23,	to	emphasise	the	historical	and	contempo-
rary	merits	of	the	Cossacks	(during	the	events	in	Crimea	in	2014).
By	 presidential	 decrees	 (no.s	 168,	 169,	 170	 and	 171),	 since	 2010	
the	VKOs	have	had	unified	uniforms	and	ranks;	they	have	been	
obliged	 to	 introduce	 special	 Cossack	 IDs	 (a	 type	 of	 small	 mili-
tary	booklet	in	passport	format,	issued	by	the	territorial	military	
police	for	five	years,	with	a	possible	extension	for	a	further	five	
years).	These	have	made	 it	easier	 for	 the	Ministry	of	Defence	 to	
keep	records	of	the	military	reserves.	Most	of	the	pages	contain	
the	term	‘military	service’,	wherein	are	entered	the	bearer’s	mili-
tary	rank	(but	not	their	Cossack	rank;	the	latter	is	classed	as	an	
‘internal	rank’	for	use	within	the	VKO),	his	military	speciality,	as	
well	as	the	training	he	has	attended.	The	highest	rank	in	the	VKO,	
that	of	Cossack	general,	is	awarded	by	the	President	of	Russia,	but	
the	higher	officer	ranks,	the	so-called	main	ranks	(such	as	esaul,	
starshyna,	Cossack	colonel,	sotnik)	are	awarded	by	the	President’s	
representative	 in	 the	 federal	 oblast,	 while	 the	 lower	 ranks	 are	
conferred	by	the	governor	of	the	region.	A	separate	decree	regu-
lates	 the	possession	of	hand	weaponry,	sabres	 (shashko)	and	the	
traditional	nahaika.	Equipping	the	Cossack	formations	with	small	
arms	(which	the	Cossacks	have	long	been	clamouring	for)	is	still	
a	contentious	matter	 for	 the	government	(although	participants	
in	special	actions	do	receive	them:	some	observers	claim	that	ata-
man	Kozitsyn	withdrew	from	the	Donbas	when	his	Cossacks	ran	
out	of	ammunition).
Discipline	in	these	so-called	troops	is	poor.	According	to	the	above-
mentioned	ataman	Doluda,	 in	2016	the	legally	mandated	annual	
23	 Участие	казаков	в	юбилейном	параде	официально	подтвердили	в	Ми-
ни	стерстве	обороны	РФ.	Подробности,	http://www.vkpress.ru/vkinfo/
uchastie-kazakov-v-yubileynom-parade-ofitsialno-podtverdili-v-minister-
stve-oborony-rf-podrobnosti/?id=76219
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krugs	for	accounting	and	electing	leaders	were	held	in	only	5	out	
of	9	districts	of	the	Kuban	Troops’	VKO,	and	in	only	15	of	the	59	lo-
cal	organisations.	The	ataman	also	harshly	criticised	their	mili-
tary	insubordination:	56%	of	the	regional	organisations’	atamans	
failed	to	turn	up	for	military	field	exercises.	Cossacks	participat-
ing	in	patrol	duties	often	conduct	themselves	arbitrarily:	they	as-
sault	thieves	and	drug	addicts	with	their	nahaikas,	put	criminals	
in	irons,	conduct	unlawful	investigations,	and	so	on.
‘Military’	 discipline	 is	 also	 breached	 by	 atamans	 of	 individual	
troops.	 In	September	2013,	Metropolitan	Cyril	 of	Stavropol,	 the	
chairman	of	the	Synod	Committee	for	Cooperation	with	Cossack-
dom,	imposed	a	clerical	punishment	(epithymia)	on	the	atamans	
of	 the	Terek	 (Sergei	Klimenko24),	 Central	 (Valery	Nalimov)	 and	
Trans-Baikal	VKOs	(Sergei	Bobrov),	on	charges	of	separatist	ac-
tivities	 among	 the	 troops	 entrusted	 to	 them,	which	 resulted	 in	
their	dismissal	from	their	duties.	In	the	official	press,	the	subject	
was	 taboo;	 from	the	Cossack	 forums25,	 in	which	 the	case	raised	
a	wave	of	criticism	of	the	Church,	it	is	known	that	the	metropoli-
tan’s	decision	was	agreed	upon	with	Aleksander	Beglov,	the	head	
of	 the	 Presidential	 Council	 for	 Cossackdom.	The	 disgraced	 ata-
mans	were	removed	from	the	Council.	
24	 Police	major-general	Sergei	Klimenko	was	appointed	by	President	Putin	in	
2012	as	ataman	of	the	Terek	Troops	with	the	rank	of	Cossack	General	(in	
the	official	narrative:	he	was	chosen	as	ataman	during	the	Great	Krug).	He	
came	into	conflict	with	the	head	of	the	Northern	Caucasian	Federal	District,	
Aleksandr	Khloponin	and	the	authorities	of	the	Stavropol	krai,	and	then	set	
the	Cossacks	against	the	authorities	and	each	other.	As	mentioned,	he	de-
manded	the	transfer	to	the	Terek	Troops	of	the	cognac	factory	in	Kizlyar	
and	the	Kavkazminkurortresursy	business	responsible	for	managing	the	
holiday	resorts	and	mineral	waters	in	the	Caucasus,	and	took	his	demands	
directly	to	President	Putin,	bypassing	the	local	authorities.	Klimenko's	re-
moval	deepened	the	split	within	the	Terek	Troops,	as	a	significant	part	of	his	
followers	left	the	force	and	became	more	radical,	publicly	criticising	both	the	
authorities	and	the	Orthodox	Church.
25	 Кто	и	как	сегодня	правит	казаками?,	http://kazak-center.ru/news/kto_i_
kak_segodnja_pravit_kazakami/2013-09-23-2631
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Penalties	like	the	above-mentioned	levelled	against	the	Cossacks	
are	becoming	a	more	common	manifestation	of	their	punishment:	
in	May	2017	in	Krasnodar,	the	Orthodox	Church	imposed	an	epi-
thymia	on	six	Cossacks	who	had	been	working	with	the	electoral	
staff	of	the	opposition	activist	Aleksei	Navalny.	The	Kuban	Troops’	
VKO	expelled	one	of	its	members	for	the	same	reason.	The	legal	
instruments	used	against	 the	Cossacks	are	not	discussed	 in	 the	
central	media,	although	echoes	of	high-profile	detentions	persist	
in	the	local	press26.	It	is	also	worth	mentioning	in	this	context	the	
amendment	passed	this	year	to	the	law	on	the	Russian	Cossacks’	
state	service,	whose	rapid	approval	by	the	Duma	was	announced	
by	President	Putin27.	The	amendment	expanded	all	the	limits	and	
restrictions	of	the	anti-corruption	legislation	to	the	atamans;	they	
were	deprived	of	the	fees	they	had	received	for	the	Cossack	asso-
ciations’	small	businesses,	and	henceforth	they	must	also	submit	
an	annual	report	about	their	own	income,	as	well	as	that	of	their	
wives	and	minor	children.
4. The ‘Cossack component’ as a subject in education and 
state policy
The essence of the state’s new policy towards Cossackdom is 
found in the term ‘the Cossack component’. This emphasises 
the allegedly colossal patriotic, spiritual, civic and economic 
26	 One	example	is	the	case	of	the	ataman	Anatoly	Kuslivy,	founder	and	director	
of	the	private	Cossack	cadet	corps	in	Simferopol,	which	has	been	going	on	for	
more	than	a	year.	In	April	2016	he	was	arrested	on	charges	of	paedophilia	and	
exploiting	the	work	of	his	cadets.	The	state	media	immediately	distanced	itself	
from	the	ataman,	calling	him	a	‘pseudo-Cossack’	and	a	‘crossdresser’,	and	an-
nounced	the	appointment	of	a	state-run	Cossack	cadet	school	(М.	Аванесова,	
Ряженых	нам	не	надо,	https://gazetacrimea.ru/news/ryajenih-nam-ne-na-
do-22671).	Social	media	have	in	turn	been	used	to	organise	pickets	and	posted	
petitions	by	 the	cadets’	parents	demanding	 the	ataman’s	 release	 (https://
vk.com/club52077285).	This	incident	has	also	proved	to	be	an	excellent	con-
tribution	to	the	practice	of	the	Kremlin’s	policy	towards	the	Cossacks.
27	 Федеральный	закон	от	1	мая	2017	г.	N	82-ФЗ	О	внесении	изменений	в	ста	-
тью	5	Федерального	закона	"О	государственной	службе	российского	
казачества",	Российская Газета,	 3	May	 2017,	 	 https://rg.ru/2017/05/03/
kazaki-dok.html
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potential of the Cossacks, who in the official narrative has be-
come a model for Russian society, its economic enterprise and 
its pro-defence activity. The Cossacks, as a kind of ‘healthy’ 
grassroots organisation of society, innately opposed to oppo-
sitionist organisations, constitute the most important argu-
ment for the existence of a civil, subjective society in Russia. 
Like the concept analysed above, the term does not so much 
describe reality as creates it. 
The new wave of Cossack-mania in the national narrative has 
coincided with the return of the previously announced ‘mod-
ernisation of Russia towards traditionalism’, which clearly ac-
celerated after the events on the Maidan in Kiev. ‘Faith’ in the 
national narrative has been strengthened by the Orthodox 
Church, which stresses that the Cossacks have always stood in 
the defence not only of Russia’s borders, but of the Orthodox faith.
The	term	‘the	Cossack	component’	appeared	in	the	context	of	the	
patriotic	education	of	 children	and	youth	as	 the	name	of	an	 in-
dividual	school	subject.	The	textbooks	and	methodological	guide-
lines	were	prepared	by	the	Razumovsky	State	University	of	Tech-
nology	and	Management	in	Moscow,	which	since	2014	has	acted	
as	the	First	Cossack	University.	By	a	decision	of	the	Presidential	
Council	 for	Cossack	Affairs,	 this	 institute	became	the	methodo-
logical	centre	and	the	headquarters	for	implementing	innovative	
technology	 in	Cossack	enterprises	and	farms.	The	choice	of	 this	
institute	was	justified	by	the	lack	of	qualified	management	per-
sonnel	in	the	agricultural	regions	of	compact	Cossack	residence,	
which	makes	it	difficult	for	them	to	organise	their	own	agricul-
tural	processing	plants.	The	Cossack	University	educates	150	such	
professionals	per	year	(10	at	the	University	of	Moscow,	the	others	
in	18	regional	branches).	The	University	stresses	the	importance	
of	the	Cossacks	as	a	substantial	part	of	civil	society28.
28	 Казачий	компонент	в	высшем	образовании,	http://mgutm.ru/kazach-
estvo/formation.php
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According	 to	 education	 minister	 Olga	 Vasileva29,	 the	 Cossack	
component	 is	 one	 subject	 in	 the	 continuous	 education	 which	
90,000	children	and	young	people	in	4000	institutions	(kinder-
gartens,	schools,	Cossack	classes	and	Cossack	cadet	corps,	voca-
tional	training	centres	and	universities)	are	undergoing.	They	are	
inculcated	with	a	coherent	system	of	patriotic	education	based	on	
Cossack	 traditions,	 as	well	 as	 comprehensive	military-patriotic	
programs,	including	drills.	The	subject	also	includes	civic	educa-
tion,	shaping	the	philosophical	and	ethical	attitudes	in	the	spirit	
of	 Orthodoxy,	 the	 protection	 of	 regional	 cultural	 heritage,	 etc.	
Minister	Vasileva	presents	this	project	as	a	kind	of	assistance	for	
Cossacks	in	the	field	of	vocational	training	and	economic	educa-
tion,	placing	it	–	in	accordance	with	the	spirit	of	the	national	nar-
rative	–	in	the	context	of	the	Cossack	associations’	self-financing	
programme.	This	 is	one	element	of	a	broader	plan	for	 the	patri-
otic	 education	 of	 children	 and	 adolescents,	 based	 (among	 other	
elements)	 on	 the	 unified	 standards	 for	 historical	 and	 cultural	
education	introduced	in	2014.	This	has	borne	fruit	in	the	return	
of	ideology	to	schools,	as	these	standards	promote	an	ideology	of	
a	perception	of	the	world	through	the	prism	of	the	‘Russian	world’	
(русский мир),	that	is,	a	civilisation	based	on	traditional,	spiritu-
ally	 Orthodox	 values.	 These	 educational	 activities	 are	 actively	
supported	by	the	Orthodox	clergy,	who	have	expanded	this	topic	
to	include	discussions	of	religious	security,	that	is,	the	ability	to	
resist	pressure	from	foreign	cultures30.
Since	 2016	 the	 ‘Cossack	 component’	 school	 subject	 has	 also	 in-
cluded	 training	 in	cyber-warfare.	This	 is	 confirmed	by	 increas-
ingly	numerous	reports	of	Cossack	cyber-volunteers.	Their	tasks	
29	 From	 a	 report	 of	 the	meeting	 of	 the	Council	 for	 Cossack	Affairs	 for	 the	
President	of	the	RF	on	16	November	2016:	Состоялось	заседание	Совета	
при	Пре	зи	денте	Российской	Федерации	по	делам	казачества,	http://
ввко.рф/news/632-v-moskve-sostoyalos-zasedanie-soveta-pri-prezidente-
rossiyskoy-federacii-po-delam-kazachestva.html
30	 Практическая	лекция:	„Религиозная	безопасность”,	https://ok.ru/mgu-
tuim.ru/topic/66111008394087
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allegedly	include	searching	for	prohibited	content	on	the	Russian	
internet,	unmasking	criminal	social	networks	 that	promote	ex-
tremism	and	terrorism,	and	combating	informational	aggression	
by	 the	West,	 etc.	These	 cyber-volunteers,	 groups	 of	which	have	
appeared	in	different	regions,	are	required	to	swear	the	Cossack	
oath31.	At	their	rally	at	the	First	Cossack	University	in	April	2017	
–	which	was	attended	by	representatives	of	the	Presidential	Coun-
cil	for	Cossack	Affairs,	the	head	of	the	government	agency	for	su-
pervising	Internet	communication	Roskomnadzor,	the	head	of	the	
Secure	Internet	League,	and	Father	Timofey	(Chaykin),	who	has	
been	appointed	by	the	Church	to	the	students’	pastoral	care	–	their	
role	as	defenders	of	the	virtual	and	cultural	boundaries	of	Russia	
was	emphasised,	as	were	their	special	merits.	As	stated,	within	
just	six	months	the	Cossack	cyber-volunteers’	missions	led	to	the	
blocking	of	26,000	portals	promoting	‘terrorism	and	extremism’	
and	‘radical	Ukrainian	propaganda’.32	
The	above-mentioned	development	of	 ‘Cossack’	economic	poten-
tial	can	be	interpreted	on	the	one	hand	as	a	modern	variant	of	the	
exchange	of	military	service	for	relief	and	concessions,	which	is	
familiar	from	history;	and	on	the	other	hand,	as	a	reproduction	
of	 the	 process	 from	 the	 early	 2000s	when	 there	was	 a	massive	
influx	of	siloviki	 into	the	economy,	and	when	senior	representa-
tives	of	 the	security	structures	 took	up	managerial	positions	 in	
companies	and	on	their	supervisory	boards,	leading	to	the	rena-
tionalisation	and	concentration	of	the	state’s	economic	assets.	In	
the	present	case,	this	process	has	come	down	to	the	regional	level,	
and	now	involves	regional	security	elites.	As	the	new	administra-
tors	of	allotments	from	the	state	land	fund,	they	are	supposed	to	
31	 The	 Kaliningrad	 Cossack	 Institute	 of	 Technology	 and	 Design,	 which	 is	
a	branch	of	the	First	Cossack	University,	has	already	trained	and	sworn	in	
two	internet	teams	(И.	Марков,	В	Калининграде	начнется	формирование	
казачьей	кибердружины,	Комсомольская Правда,	16	March	2017,	http://
www.kaliningrad.kp.ru/online/news/2685452.
32	 М.	Лемуткина,	Казаки	нашли	в	интернете	дьявола	и	объявили	ему	войну,	
Московский Комсомолец,	12	April	2017,	http://www.mk.ru/social/2017/04/12/
kazaki-nashli-v-internete-dyavola-i-obyavili-emu-voynu.html
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guarantee	the	technological	leap	forward	of	Russian	agriculture,	
to	 develop	 the	 production	 of	 organic	 food,	 agro-tourism,	 horse	
stables,	equine	therapy,	etc.
By	presenting	neo-Cossackdom	as	the	management	of	the	agricul-
tural	and	food	production	sector,	the	official	narrative	emphasises	
the	Cossacks’	role	in	ensuring	Russia’s	food	security	and	the	self-
sufficiency	 of	 Russian	 agriculture,	which	has	 been	 of	 interest	 to	
the	Kremlin	since	the	introduction	in	2014	of	Western	sanctions	on	
food	imports	to	Russia.	Sensing	an	opportunity,	the	Cossack	asso-
ciations	have	begun	to	offer	their	mediation	in	the	food	trade33.	This	
economic	entrepreneurship,	in	addition	to	the	self-financing	of	the	
Cossack	 troops,	 is	additionally	 intended	 to	 lead	 to	 the	settlement	
of	Siberia	and	the	Far	East,	the	safe	supply	of	food	to	strategic	con-
sumers	(the	armed	forces,	the	State	Reserves	Committee,	Rosatom,	
the	Russian	railways,	Gazprom,	Rosneft	and	others),	as	well	as	state	
control	over	food	prices,	both	wholesale	and	retail.	This	narration,	
as	it	shapes	reality,	is	being	disseminated	by	the	atamans:	the	‘Cos-
sack	troops’	they	control	produce	food	and	gain	a	competitive	ad-
vantage,	 namely	 broad	 access	 to	 strategic	 consumers.	 It	 seems	
significant	that	this	public	discourse	has	completely	failed	to	take	
the	principles	of	the	market	economy	into	account.	This	discourse	
contains	no	information	on	the	sources	of	any	funding	for	such	pro-
jects,	making	it	difficult	to	forecast	not	only	their	effectiveness,	but	
also	whether	they	can	even	be	implemented.
Another	potential	 source	of	 cash	flows	 for	 the	Cossacks	 is	 their	
paid	security	 service.	This	business	 is	a	 tried	and	 tested	way	of	
funding	 security	 departments	 outside	 the	 state	 budget.	 In	 the	
case	of	the	neo-Cossacks	it	is	seen	as	almost	a	necessity:	the	mili-
tary	Cossack	associations	have	been	obliged	 to	appoint	and	reg-
ister	 security	 companies.	This	 is	 a	 short-term	 solution,	 subject	
on	 the	one	hand	to	a	political	climate	which	 favours	expanding	
33	 http://kuban24.tv/item/kubanskie-kazaki-zapustili-internet-yarmarku-
dlya-sel-hozprodukcii-179511
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business	opportunities	to	the	more	broadly	understood	‘corpora-
tions	of	force’,	and	on	the	other	to	objective	economic	conditions	
and	the	state	of	the	national	budget.	
The	problem	is	that	the	market	for	security	services	was	divided	
up	long	ago,	and	the	new	service	providers	have	to	face	powerful	
competition.	The	nature	of	this	competition,	and	of	the	competi-
tive	advantage	the	‘Cossacks’	have,	can	be	indirectly	seen	in	an	in-
cident	which	took	place	at	the	end	of	2015.	After	cuts	to	positions	
in	 the	 Russian	 Interior	 Ministry	 (which	 mainly	 affected	 posts	
outside	 the	ministry	 itself),	 the	 ‘Cossack	Guard’	Private	Protec-
tion	Enterprise	in	Moscow	signed	a	contract	with	the	Moscow	city	
authorities	to	protect	34	Moscow	courts.	After	it	was	revealed	that	
the	contract	had	been	signed	without	a	public	tender	procedure,	
the	Cossacks	withdrew	from	the	service.	Such	‘oversights’	are	to	
be	eliminated	thanks	to	a	draft	amendment	to	the	law	on	the	Rus-
sian	Cossacks’	state	service	–	presented	to	the	Duma	on	11	October	
2016	and	apparently	prepared	by	the	Russian	National	Guard,	by	
a	decree	from	the	Deputy	Prime	Minister	Dmitry	Rogozin	–	which	
states	that	the	Cossacks	will	be	more	widely	involved	in	protect-
ing	 essential	 state	 facilities	 of	 federal	 importance	 without	 the	
need	 to	 undergo	 a	 tendering	 procedure34.	 However,	 the	 project	
has	still	not	been	submitted	for	consideration	in	the	Duma.	
The	 supervision	 of	 such	 protection	 of	 important	 locations,	 spe-
cial	transports,	routes	and	installations,	as	well	as	the	protection	
of	 the	property	of	natural	and	 legal	persons,	 is	 the	 responsibil-
ity	of	the	above-mentioned	Federal	Service	of	the	National	Guard	
Troops,	 founded	 in	 2016.	 It	 also	 exercises	 supervision	 (‘federal	
state	 control’)	 over	 private	 protective	 undertakings,	 and	 over	
34	 Росгвардия	предлагает	казакам	охранять	министерства	и	прокуратуру,	
Аргументы и Факты,	12	October	2016,	http://www.kuban.aif.ru/politic/de-
tails/rosgvardiya_predlagaet_kazakam_ohranyat_ministerstva_i_proku-
raturu;	 Казаки	 могут	 начать	 служить	 в	 Росгвардии,	 22	 March	 2017,	
https://www.kavkazr.com/a/kazaki-mogut-nachat-sluzhit-v-rosgvar-
dii/28384551.html
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http://казачествомосквы.рф/news/ataman_sergej_shishkin_kazaki_za_sozdanie_chvk/2017-01-20-1382
http://казачествомосквы.рф/news/ataman_sergej_shishkin_kazaki_za_sozdanie_chvk/2017-01-20-1382
arms	in	civilian	circulation35.	The	National	Guard	has	expressed	
interest	 in	 increasing	 the	 Cossack	 contingent	 in	 its	 service	 by	
means	of	conscription,	as	well	as	in	broadening	the	scope	of	the	
Cossack	 protective	 service,	which	 presents	 itself	 as	 a	 necessity	
due	to	the	vast	territory	of	the	Russian	Federation	and	the	density	
of	strategic	locations	in	areas	of	low	population	density,	especially	
in	Siberia	and	the	Far	East.	
The	Russian	National	Guard,	together	with	the	Ministry	for	Civil	
Defence	and	Emergency	Situations	and	the	Ministry	of	Defence,	
has	officially	expressed	its	optimism	by	stressing	the	importance	
of	the	cooperation	between	the	Cossacks	and	the	territorial	bod-
ies	of	the	military	administration.	Moreover,	the	registered	Cos-
sacks	have	been	involved	for	a	long	time	in	the	protection	of	pub-
lic	order	and	public	facilities	(mainly	Orthodox	churches,	schools	
and	kindergartens).	Before	 the	National	Guard	was	established,	
the	conditions	for	joining	this	type	of	activity	were	not	prohibi-
tive:	it	was	enough	to	complete	a	‘local	assistant’s	course36.	
The	currently	observed	boom	in	the	‘business	of	force’	(including	
the	Cossack	 security	 companies	 and	 the	private	military	 compa-
nies,	which	are	only	in	the	initial	stage	of	legislation37)	can	be	in-
terpreted	 in	 different	ways,	 including	 as	 a	 transition	 to	 Cossack	
self-financing.	We	should	also	note	that	this	applies	to	the	formally	
registered	Cossacks,	who	have	been	reinforced	by	soldiers	sent	to	
the	reserves,	and	by	officers	of	 the	structures	of	 force,	 for	whom	
the	Cossacks	have	always	been	a	brand-name,	a	commercial	trade-
mark	offering	specific	services.	The	Kremlin	has	always	treated	the	
‘business	of	force’	not	only	as	a	way	to	solve	the	problem	of	what	
35	 According	to	 the	government	newspaper	Rossiyskaya Gazeta	 (5	 July	2016)	
there	are	half	a	million	private	security	guards	working	in	Russia,	and	more	
than	7	million	weapons	of	various	calibres	in	private	circulation.
36	 А.	Бойко,	Росгвардия	прирастает	есаулами	и	атаманами,	Комсомольская 
Правда,	11	October	2016,	http://www.kp.ru/daily/26592/3608699/
37	 С.	Шишкин:	 Казаки	 за	 создание	 ЧВК,	 ht	tp://	казачествомосквы.	рф/
news/ataman_sergej_shishki _kazaki_za sozdanie_chvk/2017-01- -1382
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to	do	with	people	sent	to	the	reserves,	but	also	as	a	reserve	for	the	
armed	forces	which	is	in	a	constant	state	of	combat	readiness.	Call-
ing	it	a	foundation	of	civil	society	and	of	the	state/public	partner-
ship	 seems	 to	 be	 an	 abuse:	 expanding	 the	 security	 and	 defence	
sectors	translates	in	fact	to	an	expansion	of	the	use	of	violence	as	
a	regulator	in	the	relationship	between	the	state	and	its	citizens.	
One	spectacular	element	of	the	authorities’	policy	regarding	the	
Cossacks	is	the	propaganda	of	the	state,	which	uses	all	the	forces	
and	means	at	 its	disposal	 to	 this	end.	Every	day	sees	 the	use	of	
slogans	and	symbols,	as	evidenced	by	the	terms	discussed	above,	
which	are	common	in	official	narratives.	These	are	reinforced	by	
a	series	of	recurring	images:	parades,	changes	of	the	guard,	and	
a	 14-episode	 television	series	based	on	Mikhail	Sholokhov’s	And 
quiet flows the Don,	which	was	retold	in	2015	in	the	form	of	a	soap	
opera.	Cossack	folklore	plays	a	role	which	is	difficult	to	overesti-
mate,	as	 it	has	 in	 fact	been	promoted	by	professional	state	song	
and	dance	ensembles	 such	as	 the	Kuban	Cossack	Choir,	 the	en-
semble	of	the	Don	Cossacks	from	Rostov,	the	Stavropolye	group,	
and	the	‘Cossacks	of	Russia’	from	Lipetsk.	Their	international	ap-
pearances	are	effective	PR	for	Russia38.	
The	role	of	the	 ‘Cossack	component’,	as	a	morally	and	physically	
healthy	reserve	of	the	armed	forces	of	the	Russian	Federation,	is	
stressed	in	military	propaganda39.	The	Ministry	of	Defence,	which	
had	previously	been	strongly	opposed	to	 the	wider	 involvement	
38	 Here	is	how	the	performances	by	the	‘Cossacks	of	Russia’	were	advertised	
in	Poland:	“The	Cossack	show	will	take	place	as	part	of	a	tour	around	Polish	
cities.	The	Polish	audience	(...)	will	be	able	to	see	them	for	the	first	time	on	
the	Polish	stage.	And	all	of	it	enveloped	in	an	impressive	staging,	enriched	
with	colourful	folklore	costumes,	decorated	in	a	style	of	the	songs,	somewhat	
contentious,	but	very	characteristic	of	the	‘Cossack’	regions.	Another	charac-
teristic	feature	of	the	show	is	also	the	breath	of	freedom	that	the	spectators	
can	sense,	which	after	all,	is	an	integral	attribute	of	Cossack	life.”	(https://
zabrze.com.pl/i,oszalamiajacy-wielki-balet-kozacki,200274,29932.html).
39	 Д.	Сергеев,	Оседлать	Т-80:	на	что	способны	российские	казаки,	13	Novem-
ber	2016,	ТВ	Звезда,	https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201611130847-
y6uz.htm
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of	 the	unskilled	Cossacks	 in	defence	 tasks40	 and	 turning	 it	 into	
‘a	kind	of	 army’,	 is	now	 (at	 least	declaratively)	 changing	 its	 ap-
proach,	 placing	 the	 emphasis	 on	 giving	 the	 Cossacks	 military	
training	as	an	organisational	base	for	territorial	defence.	Accord-
ing	 to	Nikolai	Makarov,	 the	main	 ideologue	of	Russia’s	military	
reforms,	chief	of	general	staff	of	the	Russian	army,	and	currently	
an	advisor	to	Defence	Minister	Sergei	Shoigu,	the	Cossacks	will	
form	the	core	of	the	reserve	and	contract	services	in	the	army.	As	
part	of	the	official	narrative,	the	general	has	stated	that	the	Gen-
eral	Staff	will	gradually	create	 ‘Cossack	 troops’	with	 the	aim	of	
creating	at	least	one	Cossack	brigade	in	each	military	district41.	
According	 to	 General	 Konstantin	 Sivkov,	 Vice-President	 of	 the	
Academy	of	Geopolitical	Sciences,	“the	Cossacks	may	prove	use-
ful	as	a	protective	force	and	as	defence	of	facilities	and	roads,	in	
times	of	both	peace	and	war,	against	the	actions	of	the	enemy,	his	
sabotage	and	terrorist	attacks,	and	at	the	moment	of	a	declaration	
of	a	state	of	war,	as	a	force	for	its	security.”	The	general	also	specu-
lated42	upon	the	creation	of	territorial	forces	of	the	National	Guard	
on	the	basis	of	Cossack	troops.	
This	 idea	 was	 eagerly	 received	 by	 some	 atamans,	 who	 argued	
that	 the	 existing	 legislation	 already	 assigned	 the	 Cossacks	 ter-
ritorial	defence	capabilities	(defending	a	state	of	emergency	and	
martial	law,	protecting	public	order,	protecting	important	state,	
industrial	 and	 military	 facilities,	 fighting	 terrorist	 and	 bandit	
groups,	 the	 additional	 protection	 of	 Russia’s	 borders,	 removing	
the	 consequences	 of	 natural	 disasters	 and	 humanitarian	 disas-
ters,	etc.).	The	responses	by	the	atamans	as	posted	on	the	websites	
40	 Министерство	 Обороны	 Российской	 Федерации	 недовольно	 отно-
шением	казаков	к	военной	службе,	http://kazak-center.ru/news/1/2012-
02-06-1827
41	 Е.	 Созаев-Гурьев,	 Генштаб	 увеличивает	 число	 казачьих	 частей,	
Известия,	3	August	2012,	http://izvestia.ru/news/532117
42	 K.	Сивков,	Kaзачество	как	новый	род	войск.	Вечерка,	15	April	2014;	http://
vpk-news.ru/articles/19450
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of	military	Cossack	associations43	serve	as	a	natural	extension	of	
military	propaganda.	They	also	serve	an	informational	function	
(by	 spreading	 the	 idea	 of	 Cossackdom,	 explaining	 its	 strategic	
role,	giving	introductory	notes,	etc.).	
The	tone	of	this	propaganda	has	been	set	by	the	Kremlin.	For	ex-
ample,	 during	 Putin’s	 presidential	 election	 campaign	 in	 2012,	 he	
made	a	statement	concerning	the	strategic	importance	of	the	Cos-
sacks	—	 a	 ‘great	 group,	 numbering	 of	millions	 of	 Russians’.	The	
President	clearly	emphasised	that	the	Cossacks	are	under	the	care	
of	 the	Kremlin,	because	“after	 the	revolution	of	 1917,	 the	Cossack	
community	fell	victim	to	the	brutal	repression,	which	was	a	de fac-
to	genocide.	Despite	this,	the	Cossacks	survived	and	preserved	the	
memory	of	their	own	culture	and	customs.	The	state	now	has	a	duty	
to	help	them,	to	involve	them	in	military	service	and	activities	or-
ganised	for	young	people,	provide	them	with	assistance	in	bringing	
them	up	in	a	spirit	of	patriotism,	offer	them	military	training44.”	
‘Faith’	in	the	state’s	narrative	has	been	boosted	by	Patriarch	Cyril,	
who	has	ascribed	‘the	opportunity	for	a	real	revival	of	Cossackdom’	
to	its	moral	regeneration,	meaning	closer	cooperation	with	the	Or-
thodox	Church.	During	a	meeting	with	the	atamans	of	‘the	Cossack	
troops	of	Russia,	Ukraine	and	Belarus’,	the	patriarch	expressed	the	
mission	of	the	Orthodox	Church	in	broad	terms:	“The	Russian	Or-
thodox	Church,	on	whose	canonical	territory	the	Cossack	state	ap-
peared,	 bears	 responsibility	 for	 its	 spiritual	 service	 around	 the	
world45.”	But	the	clergyman	has	also	complained	that	“the	Cossacks,	
like	many	of	their	countrymen	who	were	brought	up	in	Soviet	real-
ity,	find	it	very	difficult	to	live	the	life	of	the	Church.”	He	thus	rec-
ommended	that	particular	attention	be	paid	to	the	young	generation	
43	 See	for	example	www.don-kazak.ru;	http://vko-ckv.ru;	http://slavakubani.ru;	
www.terkv.ru;	http://www.allcossacks.ru;	http://ввко.рф;	http://звко.рф;	
http://казакисибири.рф
44	 Высказывания	о	казачестве,	http://rkouvao.ru/?page_id=368
45	 Патриарх	Кирилл:	Воцерковление	казачества	–	единственный	путь	его	
возрождения,	5	December	2012,	http://www.pravoslavie.ru/57905.html
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of	the	Cossack	state,	who	should	be	brought	up	in	the	spirit	of	the	
Orthodox	 tradition;	 the	 patriarch	 assigned	 the	 Cossack	 state	 the	
role	 of	 “the	 vanguard	 of	 the	Orthodox	brotherhood	 of	 battle”	 and	
of	“the	spiritual,	cultural	and	social	 forces	of	 the	Russian	world.”46	
Television	 propaganda	 is	 directed	 at	 both	 foreign	 and	 domestic	
audiences.	At	the	end	of	2016,	RT	announced	a	project	to	resettle	
Cossacks	in	Russia’s	border	regions47.	By	a	decision	of	the	Deputy	
Prime	Minister	Dmitry	Rogozin	 in	2017,	a	pilot	programme	was	
introduced	to	defend	the	country’s	border	in	the	Far	East	(the	bor-
ders	with	China	and	Japan	will	be	guarded	by	Cossacks	from	the	
Ussuri	and	Trans-Baikal	Troops)	and	the	European	part	of	Russia	
(the	border	with	Poland	and	Lithuania	is	to	be	protected	by	iso-
lated	units	of	Cossacks	from	Kaliningrad).	Around	3000	persons	
are	to	be	involved	in	this	programme,	which	is	to	be	self-financed	
by	the	participants.	It	provides	for	the	allocation	of	Cossacks	who	
are	active	and	proven	in	service	to	areas	of	land	where	they	will	
be	 engaged	 in	 cultivation	 and	breeding	 livestock.	Over	 time,	 as	
announced,	the	experiment	is	to	be	extended:	the	entire	Russian	
borderland	is	supposed	ultimately	to	be	protected	by	Cossacks.
The	propaganda	aimed	at	the	Cossacks	themselves	carries	a	mes-
sage	 of	 persuasion	 and	 education,	 as	 seen	 in	 a	 report48	 about	
a	forthcoming	draft	law	in	the	Duma	regulating	the	issue	of	Cos-
sack	uniforms	and	distinguishing	marks.	As	stressed,	the	right	to	
wear	them	will	be	denied	to	members	of	the	Cossack	social	organ-
isations.	The	official	media	are	thus	suggesting	that	the	Kremlin,	
as	 it	works	 for	 formal	uniformity	within	 the	Cossacks,	will	not	
46	 See,	for	example,	Patriarch	Cyril’s	speech	at	the	opening	of	the	5th	Interna-
tional	Congress	of	Cossacks	in	Novocherkassk,	14	October	2015	(http://www.
patriarchia.ru/db/text/4245143.html).
47	 Казакам	доверят	охранять	границы	России	с	Польшей,	Литвой,	Китаем	
и	Японией,	RT,	18	October	2016,	https://russian.rt.com/article/326739-ka-
zakam-doveryat-ohranyat-granicy-rossii-s-polshei
48	 Запретить	карнавал:	ряженых	казаков	могут	объявить	вне	закона,	RT,	
25	November	2016,		https://russian.rt.com/russia/article/335504-ryazheni-
ye-kazaki-vne-zakona
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tolerate	unregistered,	 ‘self-proclaimed’	organisations	 that	harm	
the	image	of	the	‘real	Cossacks’.	This	has	little	to	do	with	the	situ-
ation	in	reality,	as	can	be	demonstrated	by	the	activity	of	ataman	
Kozitsyn	 in	 Ukraine,	 or	 the	 growing	 number	 of	 attacks	 on	 the	
Kremlin’s	political	opponents	(the	attack	in	Sochi	on	members	of	
Pussy	Riot,	 the	assault	on	 the	Sakharov	Centre	 in	Moscow,	 two	
attacks	on	the	opposition	politician	Aleksei	Navalny,	and	prolif-
erating	cases	of	radical	activities	by	Cossacks	such	as	the	breakup	
of	marches	by	Hari	Krishna	groups	and	demonstrations	by	gay	
people,	 the	 ostentatious	 destruction	 of	 forbidden	 food	 imports	
in	 supermarkets,	 etc.)	 carried	 out	 by	 arbitrary,	 self-proclaimed	
Cossacks.	The	perpetrators	of	these	incidents,	as	Russian	human	
rights	defenders	have	regularly	reported,	are	under	 the	protec-
tion	of	the	Kremlin,	and	have	never	borne	any	legal	consequences.	
Above	 all,	 however,	 the	 official	 propaganda	 deploys	 a	 sense	 of	
threat	from	the	West,	as	well	as	pride	in	the	new	territorial	‘con-
quests’.	This	 is	mainly	 due	 to	 the	 past	 experiences	 of	 the	 Putin	
regime:	one	effective	tool	 for	consolidating	both	society	and	the	
government	is	to	mobilise	them	in	the	face	of	threats	from	terror-
ism,	extremism,	foreign	culture,	a	‘Russian	Maidan’,	etc.	As	they	
displayed	their	joy	after	the	annexation	of	Crimea,	the	Cossacks	
collectively	 insisted	on	their	merits;	 they	even	started	bragging	
about	‘Baltic	neo-Cossacks’49.	This	means	that	they	have	joined	in	
the	game	imposed	on	them	by	the	Kremlin,	and	at	present	they	
are	clearly	presenting	themselves	as	the	guarantors	of	its	policy.	
49	 Ю.	 Каменский,	 Балтийское	 казачество	 пережило	 новое	 рождение,	
Политобразование,	29	October	2016,	http://lawinrussia.ru/content/balti-
yskoe-kazachestvo-perezhilo-novoe-rozhdenie
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II. THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE COSSACK 
QUESTION
The alleged values of Cossackdom as portrayed by the state 
and the Orthodox Church (loyalty, patriotism, observance of 
the ethical standards of Orthodoxy, the traditional model of 
a large family, and above all a militarised lifestyle) coincide 
with the objectives of the Kremlin, for whom a ‘statified’ Cos-
sackdom is equivalent to its use as a model group of so-called 
civil society. For that reason, the Kremlin has been placing 
emphasis in its official state documents and programmes on 
the patriotic education of Cossack youth, reinforcing the sen-
timent of state service, and preparing Cossacks for military 
service and the defence of public order, including expanding 
their repressive functions (breaking up opposition demon-
strations and harassing opposition activists). Transforming 
the Cossacks into a systemic element of the state’s security 
and defence architecture will lead to the regional authorities 
bearing the costs of this process.
1. The Kremlin’s strategic objectives
The	Kremlin’s	vision	of	 the	Cossacks	 is	manifested	 in	 the	docu-
ments	dedicated	to	them.	The	first	such	document	was	the	Concept 
of the Russian Federation’s state policy towards the Russian Cossacks,	
from	2008.	It	is	characterised	by	great	vagueness,	although	it	did	
give	the	Cossacks’	activity	 the	direction	of	development	desired	
by	 the	 Kremlin,	 by	 laying	 the	 emphasis	 on	 their	 state	 service.	
A	more	precisely	defined	document,	which	fits	in	with	the	Krem-
lin’s	overall	plans	for	ensuring	the	state’s	internal	and	external	se-
curity,	is	the	Strategy for the development of the Russian Federation’s 
state policy towards the Russian Cossacks to 202050,	which	President	
50	 Стратегия	развития	государственной	политики	Российской	Федерации	
в	отношении	российского	казачества,		http://state.kremlin.ru/council/16/
news/16682
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Putin	approved	on	15	September	2012.	As	stated	in	the	preamble,	
the	Kremlin	intends	to	achieve	its	policy	objectives	in	the	follow-
ing	manner:
•	 by	 creating	 economic	 conditions	 which	 would	 involve	 the	
members	 of	 the	 Cossack	 associations	 in	 the	 service	 of	 the	
state;
•	 developing	the	spiritual	bases	of	the	traditional	lifestyle	and	
unique	forms	of	culture	of	Russian	Cossackdom;
•	 increasing	the	Cossacks’	role	in	the	education	of	young	people	
in	a	spirit	of	patriotism	and	love	for	the	homeland,	as	well	as	
a	readiness	to	serve	it,	in	which	the	Cossack	cadets’	corps	are	
intended	to	play	an	important	role;
•	 developing	and	intensifying	contacts	between	the	Cossacks	in	
Russia	with	Cossacks	in	the	countries	of	the	Commonwealth	of	
Independent	States.	
This	strategy	commits	the	federal	bodies	of	state	power,	the	bod-
ies	of	power	of	 the	Russian	Federation’s	republics,	and	other	 lo-
cal	 government	 authorities	 to	 implementing	 a	 coherent	 policy	
towards	the	Cossacks	which	should	take	the	following	questions	
into	account:
•	 organising	the	Russian	Cossacks’	state	service;
•	 improving	 the	 relationship	between	 state	power	&	 the	 local	
administrations	and	the	Cossacks;
•	 supporting	the	Cossacks’	economic	development;
•	 protecting	and	developing	Cossack	culture,	as	well	as	working	
with	the	Cossack	youth,	its	patriotic	and	military	education,	
its	physical	and	spiritual/religious	training;
•	 supporting	 the	 international	 activities	 of	 the	 Russian	 Cos-
sacks;
•	 protecting	the	heraldic	livery	of	the	Russian	Cossacks’	activi-
ties	 (i.e.	 standardising	 the	 distinguishing	 marks,	 uniform	
designs	and	regalia	of	 individual	Cossack	 troops),	 as	well	 as	
defending	their	historical	heritage.
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The	vague	wording,	along	the	 lines	of	 ‘strengthening	the	role	of	
the	Cossacks	 in	 resolving	 the	 state’s	 and	 local	 tasks’,	 ‘the	maxi-
mum	use	of	 the	potential	of	Cossack	organisations	and	commu-
nities	 in	 harmonising	 inter-ethnic,	 inter-religious	 and	 inter-
confessional	dialogue’	and	‘management	of	the	border	areas	and	
other	poorly	inhabited	or	uninhabited	territories	of	the	Russian	
Federation’	does	not	conceal	the	basic	objective,	which	is	to	con-
solidate	the	still	divided	and	diffuse	Cossack	organisations.	This	
strategy	has	underpinned	the	long-term	goals	associated	with	the	
development	of	neo-Cossackdom	by	including	it	into	the	following	
spheres:
•	 the	 security	 and	 defence	 system	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation,	
through	direct	service	in	the	armed	forces	of	the	Russian	Fed-
eration,	serving	in	the	military	formations	of	so-called	‘other	
troops’,	and	in	the	reserves	of	the	Armed	Forces;
•	 the	public	security	system;
•	 the	system	of	protection	against	environmental	and	fire	haz-
ards,	and	of	removing	the	consequences	of	emergencies;
•	 the	system	for	defending	the	state	border.
These	aims	are	not	new.	Since	1992,	Cossacks	have	been	protect-
ing	the	residence	of	the	Patriarch	and	Cossack	border	guard	regi-
ments,	as	well	as	volunteer	militia	patrols,	had	already	been	cre-
ated	in	the	days	of	President	Boris	Yeltsin.	The	military	Cossack	
associations’	manner	of	operation	and	the	signing	of	contracts	with	
them	were	 regulated	 in	2009	by	 then-Prime	Minister	Vladimir	
Putin	 in	Government	Order	no.	806.	However,	 the	development	
of	the	Cossacks	and	the	reinforcement	of	their	status	as	a	milita-
rised	community	were	underpinned	with	quantifiable	privileges	
and	concessions	in	an	official	document	for	the	first	time,	which	
was	 justified	by	moving	 the	Cossacks	 to	a	 self-financing	model.	
Another	 innovation	was	 the	scale	of	 the	project,	which	covered	
the	whole	 territory	of	 the	Russian	Federation	 (including	all	 the	
military	districts),	as	well	as	the	specific	mechanisms	for	imple-
mentation.	These	were	spread	over	three	stages:
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•	The creation of a central database of Cossack organisations through 
their duplicate registration; issuing their members new Cossack 
IDs;
•	The creation of a legal basis for the transition of Cossack organi-
sations to the self-financing model (the establishment of private 
protection companies, the assignment to Cossack communities of 
agricultural allotments from the state land fund);
•	Development of Cossack education (the ‘Cossack component’);
•	Securing the state’s information policy (Cossack websites; book se-
ries, sociological studies)
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•	Improving the federal and local legal bases for the Cossacks’ state 
service;
•	Recruiting ‘Cossack’ military units to 80% capacity;
•	Signing contracts with members of the military Cossack associa-
tions for their voluntary participation in the reserves, to be called 
up during states of emergency and at the outbreak of war;
•	Appointing private protection companies for all Cossack troops;
•	Adopting regional and municipal programmes to support the devel-
opment of the Russian Cossacks;
•	Implementing programmes for creating/reconstructing the mili-
tary headquarters of Cossack associations.
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•	Transferring all Cossack associations to the state registry, ensuring 
that 100% of their members hold the new Cossack IDs;
•	National service to be carried out by at least 35% of the military Cos-
sack associations’ members;
•	Cossack military associations are to be self-financing organisations 
(on the basis of their contracts with local authorities, their private 
businesses and farms);
•	Members of military associations are included in the records of the 
reserves of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, to be called 
up during states of emergency and the outbreak of war;
•	In the Southern Military District, an experiment is being carried 
out to call up the organisational reserve of one or two Cossack mili-
tary associations;
•	Extending continual Cossack education programs for Cossack youth 
in the CIS countries, as well as establishing a network of summer 
camps for patriotic and civic-military education for young Cossacks 
within the CIS.
•	The organisation of a World Forum for Cossack Orthodox Youth and 
a World Congress of Cossacks.
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The	main	executors	of	 this	 strategy	are	 the	ministries	and	gov-
ernment	agencies,	and	the	‘subcontractors’	are	the	local	authori-
ties	of	the	Russian	Federation’s	entities.	Initially	the	government	
approved	the	annual	series	of	plans	for	2012	and	2013.	However,	
the	plan	for	actions	to	implement	the	Strategy of the state’s policy 
towards the Russian Cossacks	in	the	period	2014-16,	which	had	been	
confirmed	on	29	 July	2014,	was	criticised	as	being	 ineffective	at	
eliminating	the	divisions	among	the	Cossacks51.	The	government	
confirmed	the	plan	of	actions	for	the	last	stage	of	 implementing	
the	Strategy	 on	 17	February	2017	 (by	Decree	no.	285-p),	obliging	
the	governments	of	RF	entities	to	participate	in	its	execution	and	
prepare	their	own	plans	for	 implementation52.	These	will	be	su-
pervised	by	the	Federal	Agency	for	Nationality	Affairs,	which	will	
report	 to	 the	government	on	 the	current	status	 twice	a	year,	 in	
February	and	August.	
Due	to	centralisation,	and	the	federal	centre	holding	the	exclusive	
right	to	monitor	the	security	and	defence	sector,	the	local	authori-
ties’	role	is	limited	to	performing	the	tasks	imposed	by	the	centre.	
The	list	of	these	tasks	is	growing:	according	to	an	amendment	to	
the	law	on	the	mobilisation	and	mobilisation	preparations	made	
in	February	201753	the	governors	and	heads	of	the	regional	and	lo-
cal	authorities	will	be	personally	responsible	for	the	preparations	
and	implementation	of	the	mobilisation	upon	a	declaration	of	war.	
In	this	way	they	will	ease	the	burden	on	the	Ministry	of	Defence,	
which	manages	the	mobilisation	system,	activates	the	training	of	
the	reserves,	and	assesses	the	state	of	mobilisation	preparedness.	
From	the	ministry’s	point	of	view,	these	evaluations	have	not	been	
successful.	One	proposed	remedy	is	an	experiment	involving	the	
signing	of	short-term	contracts	(for	3	to	5	years)	with	those	Cos-
51	 Чтобы	вместо	консолидации	казачества	не	происходило	 его	 разъе-
динение,	 http://kazak-center.ru/news/vmesto_konsolidacii_kazachest-
va_proiskhodit_ego_razedinenie/2017-01-16-3246
52	 https://government.consultant.ru/documents/3716066	
53	 Федеральный	закон	от	22	февраля	2017	г.	N-19-ФЗ,	Российская Газета,	
27	February	2017,	https://rg.ru/2017/02/27/mobilizaciya-dok.html
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sacks	remaining	in	the	reserves	of	the	Russian	Federation’s	armed	
forces54.	This	solution,	as	may	be	assumed	on	the	basis	of	the	pub-
lic	discussion,	is	in	the	interest	of	both	the	local	authorities	and	
the	Cossacks.
An	analysis	of	these	executive	documents	leads	to	the	conclusion	
that	 this	 policy	 has	 been	 subject	 to	 extreme	 bureaucratisation.	
For	example,	the	Ministry	of	Justice	is	supposed	to	have	developed	
a	timetable	to	add	the	Cossack	organisations	to	the	State	registry;	
carried	out	an	analysis	of	how	the	local	authorities	apply	the	legal	
acts	concerning	the	Cossacks;	and	drawn	up	and	introduced	the	
adoption	of	new	laws,	including	the	law	on	the	Cossacks’	develop-
ment.	A	significant	part	of	 these	 laws	are	also	purely	 formal	 in	
nature.	For	example,	 the	Federal	Security	Service	 is	 committed	
to	 employing	 the	 Cossacks	 to	 defend	 the	 borders	 (as	 they	 have	
done	since	 the	1990s);	 the	National	Guard	 is	 to	expand	the	Cos-
sacks’	service	in	its	own	units	and	defend	state	locations	(this	is	
a	statutory	obligation	for	both	the	Cossack	forces	and	the	National	
Guard);	and	the	Interior	Ministry	is	to	include	Cossack	military	
associations	in	the	defence	of	public	order	(which	they	have	done	
for	a	number	of	years).
This	bureaucratic	inflation	can	be	seen	in	the	wording	of	similar	
plans	 for	 the	 individual	 local	authorities	of	 the	Russian	Federa-
tion,	which	have	been	obliged	 to	make	such	preparations.	Also,	
each	of	the	projects	mentioned	in	the	plan	in	the	Rostov	oblast55	
will	be	subject	to	reports	(twice	in	the	reporting	year).	
54	 Минобороны	ищет	пути	по	сокращению	фактов	уклонения	резерви-
стами	от	прохождения	военных	сборов,	Военное Обозрение,	6	October	
2015,	https://topwar.ru/83755-minoborony-ischet-puti-po-sokrascheniyu-
faktov-ukloneniya-rezervistami-ot-prohozhdeniya-voennyh-sborov.html
55	 Об	утверждении	плана	мероприятий	по	реализации	в	2017-2020	годах	
Стратегии	развития	государственной	политики	Российской	Федерации	
в	отношении	российского	казачества	до	2020	года	в	Ростовской	области,	
http://www.donland.ru/documents/Ob-utverzhdenii-plana-meropriyatijj-
po-realizacii-v-2017-%E2%80%93-2020-godakh-Strategii-razvitiya-gosu-
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In	accordance	with	the	legal	provisions,	the	state’s	policy	towards	
the	Cossacks	will	be	funded	from	both	the	federal	and	local	budg-
ets.	Due	to	the	lack	of	comprehensive,	reliable	data,	the	expenses	
for	this	purpose	are	difficult	to	estimate;	from	the	residual	infor-
mation	available,	it	appears	that	it	is	mostly	the	regional	authori-
ties	which	have	to	bear	these	costs56.	For	example,	it	is	known	that	
in	2017-2019	Rostov	oblast	will	spend	more	than	2	billion	roubles	
(US$33.9m)	on	the	Cossacks.	The	expenditure	of	Krasnodar	krai	
on	implementing	the	 ‘Kuban	Cossacks’	programme	in	2014-2016	
amounted	 to	 3.1	 billion	 roubles	 (US$52.5m).	 The	 largest	 sums	
from	 this	 programme	 have	 been	 spent	 on	 organising	 the	 state	
service	of	the	Cossacks	(1.8	billion	roubles,	or	US$30.5m),	the	Cos-
sack	cadet	corps	(730	million	roubles,	or	US$12.4m),	the	activities	
of	 the	 Kuban	 Cossacks’	 state	 company	 (458	million	 roubles,	 or	
US$7.8m),	and	on	military/patriotic	education	(64	million	roubles,	
or	US$1.1m).	The	Crimean	Cossacks,	to	whom	the	2017–2020	plan	
has	allocated	37.6	million	roubles	(US$640,000),	are	financed	as	
part	of	a	programme	entitled	‘The	development	of	civil	society	and	
the	creation	of	conditions	to	ensure	national	consent’.	The	greater	
part	of	this	amount	has	been	allocated	to	the	development	of	the	
Cossacks’	state	service.	The	structure	of	regional	expenditure	is	
thus	a	part	of	the	more	general	upward	trend	in	spending	on	se-
curity	and	defence	at	the	expense	of	social	spending.	Moreover,	
it	is	known	that	individual	projects	involving	the	Cossacks	have	
also	been	financed	from	the	presidential	grants’	fund57,	as	well	as	
from	sponsorships	that	are	initiated	by	the	state	and	the	Ortho-
dox	Church.	
darstvennojj-politiki-Rossijjskojj-Federacii-?pageid=128483&mid=134977&
itemId=24908
56	 Вопросы	финансирования	казачества	на	федеральном	и	региональном	
уровнях,	http://kazak-center.ru/news/voprosy_finansirovanija_kazach-
estva_na_federalnom_i_regionalnom_urovnjakh/2016-12-03-3216
57	 This	refers	to	presidential	grants	to	third-sector	organisations	for	projects	in	
the	areas	of	‘preserving	historical	memory’,	‘the	protection	of	health,	propa-
ganda	of	a	healthy	lifestyle’,	‘the	patriotic	education	of	children	and	youth’	
and	others.	See	http://президентскиегранты.рф/Project/View/13166
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These	 stated	 commitments	 to	 supporting	 the	 Cossacks’	 socio-
economic	 development	 (which	 some	 columnists	 have	 claimed	 is	
a	break	with	the	Cossack	philosophy	of	poverty)	have	been	accom-
panied	by	the	Kremlin’s	tried	and	tested	methods	of	granting	con-
cessions	for	a	wide	range	of	‘businesses	of	force’	run	by	the	Cossack	
troops,	and	announcing	the	extension	of	the	programme	allocating	
them	land	from	the	state	land	fund.	The	costs	for	the	development	
of	 the	 Cossacks’	military	 service	 are	 borne	 by	 the	 local	 budgets.	
The	‘self-financing’	of	the	Cossack	troops	mainly	consists	of	the	lo-
cal	authorities	signing	more	or	less	profitable	contracts	with	them.	
This	has	raised	scepticism	among	some	observers,	who	recall	that	
in	the	past,	similar	mechanisms	led	to	the	criminalisation	of	the	
regions	and	the	transformation	of	the	Cossack	regiments	into	the	
local	authorities’	private	militias,	and	the	creation	of	murky	con-
nections	between	politics	and	the	economy.	Today	too,	as	has	been	
emphasised,	 the	 territorial	 delegations	 for	 the	 administration	 of	
security	and	defence	of	the	country	share	more	economic	interests	
with	the	local	authorities	than	with	the	federal	centre.	In	this	con-
text,	the	weakness	of	the	Cossacks’	private	and	cooperative	owner-
ship	were	confirmed	by	the	fate	of	42,000	hectares	of	land	allocated	
to	Cossack	associations	in	Stavropol	krai	in	the	1990s;	these	lands	
were	re-appropriated	by	the	then	leaders	of	the	Cossack	revival58.
2. The institutional system for governing the Cossacks
The bureaucratic mechanisms for the development of Cossack-
dom built into the Strategy for the development of the Russian 
Federation’s state policy towards the Russian Cossack to 2020 
are being implemented by the structures for ‘cooperation with 
the Cossacks’ created for this purpose. These have appeared in 
most central government departments, in all the federal dis-
tricts, as well as in those local administrations which have 
58	 А.	Мащенко,	Мы	–	рыцари	России.	Парадоксы	возрождения	казачества	
в	России,	Ставропольская Правда,	13	January	2017,	http://www.stapravda.
ru/20170113/paradoksy_vozrozhdeniya_kazachestva_v_rossii_99509.html
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been obliged to adopt separate legislation on the development 
of the Cossacks’ state service compatible with federal legisla-
tion. At the top of this hierarchical and bureaucratised pyra-
mid is the Presidential Council for Cossack Affairs.
The	 government’s	 policy	 towards	 the	 Cossacks	 assumed	 a	 sys-
temic	nature	with	the	creation	in	2009	of	the	Presidential	Council	
for	Cossack	Affairs,	which	was	interpreted	as	an	extension	of	the	
personal	patronage	of	the	President	to	the	Cossacks.	In	principle	
it	has	advisory	and	consultative	functions;	it	prepares	presiden-
tial	legal	acts	and	strategy	papers	on	the	development	of	Cossack-
dom.	It	is	currently	composed	mainly	of	troop	atamans	and	other	
‘registered’	Cossack	 organisations,	 as	well	 as	 representatives	 of	
the	state	administration;	it	was	approved	by	Presidential	Decree	
No.	414	of	20	December	2016.	The	council	is	headed	by	Aleksandr	
Beglov,	the	plenipotentiary	representative	of	the	President	in	the	
Central	 Federal	 District;	 and	 its	 presidium	 includes	 three	 vice-
presidents	(the	deputy	prime	ministers	Aleksandr	Khloponin	and	
Dmitry	Rogozin,	and	the	acting	secretary	of	the	Council	&	head	
of	the	Presidential	Administration’s	committee	for	internal	policy	
Andrei	Yarin).	The	composition	of	 the	presidium	was	expanded	
to	 include	 the	Council	of	 the	Cossack	Troops’	Atamans,	chaired	
by	 Nikolai	 Doluda,	 and	 the	 Expert-Consultative	 Committee	 led	
by	Murat	Ziazikov,	who	is	responsible	for	inter-ethnic	relations	
in	the	Presidential	Administration.	The	President	of	the	Council	
is	directly	subordinate	to	the	committees	for	the	development	of	
Cossackdom	established	in	all	federal	districts,	and	to	the	struc-
ture	for	cooperation	with	Cossackdom	in	the	individual	entities	of	
the	Russian	Federation.	
The	work	of	the	Council	is	carried	out	by	15	permanent	commit-
tees,	which	serve	at	the	same	time	as	coordination	bodies:
•	 the	committee	to	improve	the	organisation	of	state	service	and	
other	affairs	(headed	by	Ivan	Mironov,	ataman	of	the	Central	
Cossack	Troops);
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
2/
20
17
52
•	 the	 committee	 for	 cooperation	 between	 the	Ministry	 of	De-
fence	and	the	Cossack	associations	(Valery	Gerasimov,	Chief	
of	the	General	Staff	of	the	Armed	Forces	of	the	Russian	Federa-
tion);
•	 the	committee	for	the	protection	of	forests	and	wildlife	(Alek-
sandr	Panfilov,	deputy	head	of	the	agency	for	forestry	Rosles-
khoz);
•	 the	committee	for	the	improvement	of	cooperation	with	Rus-
sian	 Cossackdom	 (Timur	 Prokopenko,	 former	 head	 of	 the	
Young	Guard	movement,	deputy	head	of	the	Presidential	Ad-
ministration’s	Committee	for	Internal	Policy);
•	 the	committee	for	cooperation	with	Cossack	social	organisa-
tions	(Andrei	Yarin,	head	of	the	Presidential	Administration’s	
Committee	for	Internal	Policy);
•	 the	 committee	 for	 the	 development	 of	 state	 policy	 towards	
the	Cossacks	(Igor	Barinov,	head	of	the	government’s	Federal	
Agency	for	Nationality	Affairs);
•	 the	 committee	 for	 normative	 legal	 acts	 (Maxim	 Travnikov,	
deputy	minister	of	justice);
•	 the	committee	 for	 supporting	 the	Cossacks’	 economic	devel-
opment	(Aleksandr	Petrikov,	deputy	minister	of	agriculture);
•	 the	committee	for	the	development	of	the	Cossacks’	education	
system	(Olga	Vasileva,	minister	of	education);
•	 the	committee	for	scientific	research	and	cooperation	with	the	
media	(Vasily	Shestakov,	President	of	the	International	Sam-
bo	Federation);
•	 the	committee	for	the	development	of	Cossack	culture	(Alek-
sandr	Zhuravsky,	deputy	minister	of	culture);
•	 the	committee	for	the	foreign	activity	of	Russian	Cossacks	(Oleg	
Vasnetsov,	Director	of	the	MFA’s	department	for	Cossacks);
•	 the	committee	for	Cossack	cooperation	with	the	Russian	Or-
thodox	Church	(Leonid	Pokrovsky,	a.k.a.	Cyril,	Metropolitan	
of	Stavropol);
•	 the	committee	for	Cossack	heraldry	(Georgi	Vilinbakhov,	the	
head	of	the	Heraldic	Council	of	the	Russian	Federation’s	Presi-
dential	Administration);
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•	 the	 committee	 for	 supervision	 and	monitoring	 (Andrei	Kul-
ba,	deputy	head	of	 the	Presidential	Administration’s	Control	
Board).
The	committees	are	usually	chaired	by	a	federal	official,	while	the	
deputy	is	usually	a	representative	of	the	Cossacks.	For	example,	
the	committee	for	culture59	consists	of	26	members,	including	the	
directors	of	artistic	ensembles	with	the	status	of	state-owned	en-
terprises	(such	as	the	Kuban	Cossack	Choir,	the	Cossacks	of	Rus-
sia,	 the	 Trans-Baikal	 Cossacks),	 the	ministers	 of	 culture	 of	 the	
federal	 entities,	 representatives	 of	 departmental	 culture	 com-
mittees,	and	the	media	world.	The	Commission	is	chaired	by	the	
deputy	minister	of	culture	of	the	Russian	Federation;	his	deputy	
is	Vladimir	Romanov,	ataman	of	the	Orenburg	Troops.	The	Krem-
lin’s	projects	are	also	carried	out	by	members	of	the	council	who	
are	not	included	in	the	above-mentioned	committees.	For	exam-
ple	 Sergei	 Pospelov,	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Council	 and	 president	 of	
the	Russian	Youth	organisation,	was	the	initiator	of	the	Cossack	
Youth	Circle	forum	(May	2016)	which	‘decided’	to	create	the	Cos-
sack	Youth	Union.	(The	co-organisers	of	the	Circle	were	the	Min-
istry	of	Science	and	Higher	Education,	the	administration	of	the	
Rostov	oblast	and	the	First	Cossack	University)60.	
This	extensive	organisation	of	cooperation	between	the	state	and	
the	Cossacks	is	reminiscent	of	the	old	command-and-distribution	
system.	Separate	cells	dedicated	to	this	area	of	state	policy	have	
appeared	in	individual	ministries.	Platforms	for	cooperation	with	
59	 http://culture34.ru/news/%D0%A1%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0
%B2%20%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0
%B8.pdf
60	 As	reported	by	Kuban	TV	on	22	March	2017,	the	First	Assembly	of	the	Kuban	
Branch	of	Cossack	Youth,	which	was	formed	on	the	basis	of	the	Cossack	class-
es	and	Cossack	acdet	corps,	will	take	place	in	September	2017	(more	than	the	
year	after	it	was	created!).	This	can	be	interpreted	as	bureaucratic	sluggish-
ness	in	a	region	usually	regarded	as	a	leader	in	supporting	the	Kremlin's	
top-down	 initiatives.	 http://old.kubantv.ru/kuban/kazachyu-molodezh-
kubani-obedinyat-v-soyuz/
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foreign	Cossack	organisations	within	 the	Russian	Foreign	Min-
istry	include	a	department	for	cooperation	with	Cossack	associa-
tions	 and	 a	 separate	 committee	 supporting	 the	 development	 of	
Russian	 Cossackdom’s	 international	 activities61,	 which	 periodi-
cally	acquaints	Cossack	organisations	with	their	plans	for	inter-
national	activities.	
The	implementation	of	the	state	projects	is	supervised	by	a	govern-
ment-run	Inter-Agency	Committee	for	the	Implementation	of	 the	
Strategy for developing the Russian Federation’s state policy towards 
Russian Cossackdom to 2020.	Since	November	2016	the	‘official’	chair-
man	of	the	Committee	has	been	Igor	Barinov,	the	head	of	the	Fed-
eral	Agency	for	Nationality	Affairs,	who	is	a	member	of	the	Council	
for	Cossack	Affairs.	Local	administrations,	in	addition	to	individu-
al	departments	for	cooperation	with	the	Cossacks,	have	set	up	state	
enterprises,	such	as	the	Cossacks	of	the	Kuban,	the	Cossacks	of	the	
Don,	and	the	Cossack	Centre	for	State	Service	in	Volgograd62,	which	
employ	Cossacks	and	implement	these	projects.
Contrary	to	its	earlier	pledges	the	Ministry	of	Defence,	which	is	
the	main	beneficiary	of	this	policy,	has	not	set	up	a	separate	struc-
ture	for	the	collaboration	with	the	Cossacks,	although	they	work	
together	on	a	daily	basis,	as	evidenced	by	the	detailed	instructions	
issued	by	the	Main	Organisational	and	Mobilisation	Directorate	
of	 the	General	 Staff	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation’s	 Armed	 Forces63	
61	 Материалы	комиссии	по	вопросам	казачьих	обществ,	http://www.mid.
ru/materialy-komissii-po-voprosam-kazac-ih-obsestv/-/asset_publisher/
aLRfN6MT9msV/content/id/185558
62	 Создано	государственное	казенное	учреждение	Ростовской	области	
«Казаки	Дона»,	5	February	2014,	http://www.donland.ru/news/Sozdano-
gosudarstvennoe-kazennoe-uchrezhdenie-Rostovskojj-oblasti-Kazaki-Dona
?pageid=92218&mid=83793&itemId=51298;	О	государственной	программе	
Краснодарского	 края	 «Казачество	Кубани»,	http://docs.cntd.ru/docu-
ment/430655711
63	 Организация	 учета	 членов	 казачьих	 обществ,	 http://www.ataman-
ovko.ru/official_documents/metods/organizatsiya-voinskogo-ucheta-
chlenov-kazachikh-obshchestv/;	Приказ	министра	обороны	Российской	
Федерации,	http://www.ataman-ovko.ru/official_documents/executive/
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concerning	the	keeping	of	records,	pre-conscription	training	and	
retraining	for	reservists,	common	projects	in	the	field	of	patriotic	
education	for	young	people,	etc.	According	to	the	plan,	the	min-
istry	reserves	certain	units	 for	Cossack	military	associations	 in	
which	their	representatives	participate	in	military	service	(usu-
ally	in	the	vicinity	of	the	troops’	place	of	residence;	for	example,	
conscripts	from	the	Central	Cossack	Association’s	troops	are	de-
ployed	in	the	4th	Cantemir	Armoured	Brigade	in	Naro-Fominsk64;	
conscripts	from	the	Donetsk	Troops	go	to	Unit	45767	in	Kamensk-
Shakhtinsk,	and	those	from	the	Kuban	Troops	go	to	the	Cossack	
unit	of	the	Air-Landing	Troops	in	Novorossiysk).
Since	2012,	the	cooperation	between	the	Cossacks	and	the	Gener-
al	Staff	has	occurred	within	the	context	of	the	territorial	defence	
(OT)	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation65.	The	 closer	 ties	 between	 these	
bodies	have	been	demonstrated	by	partial	reports	about	a	series	of	
groups	of	mobilised	Cossack	reserves.	It	is	also	known	that,	in	ac-
cordance	with	the	provisions	of	Presidential	Decree	No.	370	dated	
July	2015	on	the	creation	of	personal	armed	forces	of	the	Russian	
Federation’s	mobilised	reserves66,	the	defence	ministry	has	signed	
contracts	with	the	Cossacks	for	them	to	remain	in	the	reserves	of	
prikazy-ministra-oborony-rf/prikaz-ministra-oborony-rossiyskoy-feder-
atsii-745-.php
64	 See	 Военная	 служба	 в	 Вооруженных	 Силах	 Российской	Федерации	
как	 один	 из	 видов	 несения	 государственной	 службы	 казаками	
Центрального	казачьего	войска	(http://ckwrf.ru/).
65	 This	coincided	with	the	amendment	to	Article	22	of	the	law	on	the	defence	
of	the	Russian	Federation,	which	was	extended	to	include	a	definition	of	ter-
ritorial	defence	(OT).	This	will	operate	at	the	outbreak	of	war	and	consists	of	
two	elements:	(1)	to	protect	and	defend	important	state	facilities	and	(2)	to	
combat	the	assaults	and	sabotage	of	the	enemy.	The	OT	organisation,	as	part	
of	the	state's	military	system,	will	be	controlled	by	the	Ministry	of	Defence	
at	the	military	district	level.	So	far,	the	Ministry	of	Defence	has	not	created	
a	separate	OT	command,	but	since	2013	elements	of	it	have	been	successively	
introduced	into	the	scenarios	for	the	announced	exercises	and	unannounced	
tests	of	combat	readiness.
66	 Указ	Президента	 Российской	Федерации	 о	 создании	мобили	за	цио-
нного	 людского	 резерва	Вооруженных	Сил	Российской	Федерации,	
http://static.kremlin.ru/media/acts/files/0001201507170019.pdf
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specific	military	units.	These	form	a	base	for	the	gradual	retrain-
ing	of	reservists.	Towards	the	end	of	April	2017,	the	territory	of	
the	Alexander	Nevsky	Guards’	Engineering	Brigade	of	the	South-
ern	Military	District,	located	in	Kamensk-Shakhtinsk,	saw	an	ex-
ercise	by	OT	soldiers	supplemented	with	Cossacks	from	the	Don	
Troops.	In	accordance	with	the	plan,	in	2017	troop	musters	lasting	
three	days	will	take	place	once	a	month67.
There	are	also	signs	that	training	is	currently	proceeding	in	in-
dividual,	non-barracked	conditions,	at	times	which	are	conveni-
ent	for	working	reservists;	this	training	presents	itself	as	a	pilot	
programme	for	supplementing	OT	units	with	reserve	troops.	This	
programme	was	tested	during	the	Kavkaz-2016	exercise,	during	
which,	as	has	been	reported,	the	47th	OT	Division	was	created	in	
Sevastopol.	For	the	most	part	 it	was	made	up	of	reservists	from	
outside	Crimea	 –	 from	Rostov	 (the	 territory	 of	 the	Don	Troops)	
and	the	Krasnodar	krai	(the	territory	of	the	Kuban	Troops)	–	who	
were	transported	to	their	assembly	points	by	air.	This	means	that	
the	OT	unit	was	set	up	without	regard	to	the	principle	of	the	local	
nature	of	territorial	defence.	In	this	context,	it	cannot	be	ruled	out	
that	the	Ministry	of	Defence’s	plans	regarding	the	neo-Cossacks	
go	beyond	the	OT.	In	Crimea	in	2014,	Cossacks	were	used	as	part	
of	the	occupation	forces,	and	were	also	used	for	special	actions.	It	
is	enough	to	mention	the	actions	of	the	unidentified	Cossacks	who	
interrupted	the	joint	naval	exercises	between	the	US	and	Ukraine	
in	2006,	and	removed	the	Ukrainian	national	flag	from	the	top	of	
a	mountain	near	Sevastopol	in	200968,	not	to	mention	the	reports	
by	the	Ukrainian	Security	Service	of	Cossack	trolling	brigades	on	
the	internet69.	
67	 Боевая	 учеба	 казаков-резервистов,	 http://kazak-center.ru/publ/novo-
sti_kazak_inform/naibolee_vazhnye/boevaja_ucheba_kazakov_rezervis-
tov/174-1-0-4283
68	 І.	Лосєв,	Україна.	ХХІ	століття.	Козацтво.	Але	чиє	воно?,	http://www.3republic.
org.ua/ua/ideas/11498
69	 В	Украине	зафиксированы	три	типа	фейковых	громад	за	которыми	
стоят	российские	спецслужбы	–	СБУ,	112.ua,	23	May	2017,	https://112.ua/
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A	distinct	place	in	the	system	supporting	the	Cossacks’	state	ser-
vice	is	held	by	the	Synod	Committee	for	Cooperation	with	Russian	
Cossackdom,	which	was	 formed	 in	March	2010	by	a	decision	of	
the	Holy	Synod	of	the	Russian	Orthodox	Church.	The	Committee,	
under	the	leadership	of	Cyril,	Metropolitan	of	Stavropol70,	has	its	
headquarters	 in	 the	Don	Monastery	 in	Moscow.	This	 is	also	 the	
Metropolitan’s	 official	 residence,	 as	 it	 is	 for	 the	 corresponding	
committee	on	the	Presidential	Council	which	it	also	directs.	Since	
2011	 the	monastery	has	been	protected	by	11	registered	Cossack	
troops	in	rotation.
As	we	read	in	the	statutes	of	the	Synod	Committee,	its	objectives	
include	the	following:
•	 dissemination	 of	 the	 fundamentals	 of	 the	 Orthodox	 faith	
among	the	members	of	 individual	Cossack	communities	and	
organisations;
•	 coordination	of	the	activities	of	the	clergy	working	with	the	
Cossacks	both	within	Russia	and	beyond	its	borders;
•	 organisation	of	traineeships	and	training	for	clergy	minister-
ing	to	the	Cossacks;
•	 carrying	out	the	continual	supervision	of	Cossack	communi-
ties	with	regard	to	their	religiosity;
•	 dissemination	among	the	Cossacks	of	religious	literature	and	
scientific/methodological	materials;	
•	 the	development	of	the	publishing	business	and	presentations	
of	information	and	documents	relating	to	the	mutual	support	
between	the	Orthodox	Church	and	the	Cossacks71.
obshchestvo/v-ukraine-zafiksirovany-tri-tipa-feykovyh-gromad-za-koto-
rymi-stoyat-rossiyskie-specsluzhby-sbu-391522.html
70	 http://www.skvk.org/
71	 http://www.skvk.org/dokumenty/ustav-sinodalnogo-komiteta-po-
vzaimodejstviyu-s-kazachestvom
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In	2010,	the	Committee	also	adopted	its	own	strategy.	A	document	
entitled	The fundamental directions of spiritual/educational work 
with the Cossack communities	underlines	the	importance	of	the	Cos-
sack/Church	 partnerships,	 of	 creating	 an	 organisational	 struc-
ture	for	work	within	the	Cossack	environment,	of	preparing	the	
Orthodox	‘hard-core’	believers	in	the	world	of	culture,	as	well	as	
in	the	civic-patriotic	education	of	Cossack	families,	promoting	the	
cultural-historical	Cossack	traditions	among	children	and	young	
people,	as	well	as	broadening	the	circle	of	economic	partners	in	
the	work	of	spiritual	and	civic-patriotic	education	of	the	Cossack	
community72.	
As	is	apparent	from	the	documents	cited,	the	spiritual	ministry	
of	the	Cossacks	has	taken	on	an	unambiguously	pro-state	dimen-
sion,	confirming	the	alliance	between	‘the	altar	and	the	throne’.	
The	Church’s	official	position	clearly	demonstrates	the	loyalty	of	
the	Church	hierarchs.	And	not	 only	 that:	 like	 the	Kremlin,	 the	
Church	is	playing	the	Cossack	card	and	strengthening	its	position	
in	society	by	doing	so.	The	platform	for	the	co-operation	between	
the	State	 and	 the	Orthodox	Church	 is	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘Orthodox	
civilisation’	which	forms	the	basis	of	the	civilisational	paradigm	
of	the	Russian	government’s	policy,	according	to	which	interna-
tional	 relations	 is	 a	 space	 for	 either	 competition	or	 cooperation	
between	 civilisations.	 Orthodox	 civilisation,	 with	 Russia	 at	 its	
head,	stands	as	a	counterbalance	to	‘degenerate’	Western	civilisa-
tion.	Both	the	Church	and	the	state	have	defined	the	boundaries	of	
their	interests	in	this	way;	this	is	why	they	deem	it	so	important	
to	maintain	the	integrity	of	the	territory	covered	by	the	adminis-
tration	of	the	Moscow	Patriarchate,	to	which	its	foreign	activities	
have	been	subordinated.	
72	 http://www.skvk.org/dokumenty/osnovnye-napravleniya-duxovno-pros-
vetitelskoj-raboty-v-kazachix-obshhestvax
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As	Metropolitan	Cyril	recently	stated	on	a	website	addressed	 to	
Ukrainian	 Cossacks73,	 the	 Synod	 Committee’s	 press	 service	 is	
conducting	 a	 wide-ranging	 information	 and	 propaganda	 cam-
paign	among	Cossacks	in	Ukraine,	Belarus,	Serbia,	Bulgaria,	the	
Czech	Republic,	Germany	and	others.	According	to	the	Metropoli-
tan,	“the	Church	is	a	centre	of	attraction	for	the	communities	of	
compatriots	abroad.	They	are	seeking	to	preserve	their	national	
identity,	and	to	unite	in	order	to	maintain	a	unified	spiritual	and	
cultural	space	in	the	CIS	countries	and	further	abroad.”	
The	foreign	dimension	of	the	Synod	Committee’s	activities	is	well	
portrayed	in	the	forums	for	Orthodox	Cossack	youth.	At	 its	 ini-
tiative,	the	First	Eurasian	Cossack	Youth	Forum	took	place	in	July	
2016	in	St.	Petersburg	(with	the	support	of	the	Foundation	for	the	
Development	of	Cossackdom	and	the	local	authorities).	This	year,	
the	 Second	 Eurasian	 Forum	 ‘Cossack	 Unity	 2017’	 took	 place	 in	
Sevastopol,	with	the	support	of	the	authorities	of	Sevastopol	and	
the	Republic	of	Crimea74.
73	 www.pravkazak.org.ua/materialy/novosti-otdela/434-intervyu-mitropol-
ita-kirilla-po-itogam-raboty-sinodalnogo-komiteta-po-vzaimodejstviyu-s-
kazachestvom-v-2016-godu	(no	access).
74	 www.skvk.org/44044
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SUMMARY
NEO-COSSACKDOM AS A SYSTEMIC, ALL-IN-ONE TOOL 
OF	THE KREMLIN
In	 the	 recent	 history	 of	 Russian	 Cossackdom,	 two	 periods	 are	
usually	 highlighted:	 (1)	 the	 exuberant	 movement	 launched	 at	
the	end	of	the	Soviet	Union,	and	(2)	the	‘statified’	movement	sub-
ject	to	strict	control	by	the	authorities	of	the	Russian	Federation.	
Whereas	the	first	period	was	characterised	by	the	Cossacks’	 fo-
cus	on	their	own	problems	and	their	struggle	for	their	own	im-
age	as	a	social	force	in	the	complex	ethnic	and	political	situation	
in	southern	Russia,	 the	second	indicates	 the	Kremlin’s	 fear	that	
the	Cossacks	may	become	an	independent	political	force,	another	
hotbed	of	separatism	and	ethnic	conflicts	within	the	Russian	Fed-
eration.	The	Cossacks	started	to	emerge	into	the	limelight	thanks	
to	Yeltsin’s	1995	decree	on	the	registry	of	Cossack	organisations.	
The	 division	 into	 registered	 and	 unregistered	 (social)	 Cossacks	
was	established	by	a	federal	law	on	the	state	service	of	the	Russian	
Cossacks	in	2005.	The	formal,	highly	bureaucratised	and	Krem-
lin-controlled	 Cossack	 military	 associations	 were	 a	 let-down	
to	a	substantial	part	of	the	Cossack	community,	and	led	to	their	
gradual	abandonment	of	these	groups.
The	current	stage	is	characterised	on	the	one	hand	by	a	declared	
desire	 to	overcome	 these	divisions,	 and	on	 the	other	by	 the	au-
thorities’	 awareness	 that	modern	 Cossackdom	will	 not	 of	 itself	
transform	into	a	civil	society	capable	of	self-organisation	and	self-
governance.	Obstacles	 to	 implementing	 this	 scenario	have	been	
systemically	 cleared	 away	 (by	 legal	 and	 organisational	means);	
In	addition,	there	is	no	room	in	Russian	political	culture	for	the	
agency	of	 society.	The	Cossacks’	 superficial	 ‘self-organisation’	 is	
controlled	and	maintained	from	the	top	down,	and	supported	eco-
nomically	 and	 ideologically	by	 the	Kremlin.	The	 instrumentali-
sation	of	the	Cossacks’	militarised	life	style,	 their	colourful	cul-
tural	symbolism,	and	their	aura	of	power	are	accompanied	by	the	
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granting	of	special	rights	to	them	(such	as	the	right	to	a	separate	
mode	of	military	service,	easy	access	to	grants	land	from	the	state	
land	fund,	the	Cossack	schools,	additional	opportunities	to	make	
money	in	private	protection,	civil	and	military	companies)	which	
are	not	available	to	other	citizens.	Similarly,	the	Kremlin-ordered	
re-registration	of	the	Cossack	associations	is	intended	to	provide	
an	 infrastructure	 for	 the	 desired	model	 of	 development	 for	 so-
called	civil	society	in	Russia.	
Neo-Cossackdom,	which	the	Kremlin	regards	as	a	systemic	aux-
iliary	 element	 in	 its	 security	 and	 defence	 architecture,	 is	 still	
presented	 as	 ‘the	 free	Cossack	 state’,	 the	bearer	 of	 ‘military	de-
mocracy’.	Since	2012	it	has	also	become	a	carrier	of	conservative	
Orthodox	values,	fighting	with	the	degenerate	West	and	Islamic	
fundamentalism,	etc.	This	is	a	clear	nod	to	the	historical	memory	
of	 the	Cossacks,	 highlighting	 their	 cultural	 distinctiveness	 and	
military-defensive	way	of	life.	This	memory	has	mainly	been	used	
instrumentally	 in	 the	 military-patriotic	 education	 of	 children	
and	young	people,	as	well	as	in	implementing	the	Cossacks’	mili-
tary	 functions	 (in	 the	reserves,	 in	civil	and	 territorial	defence).	
The	Cossack	experiment,	as	tested	in	the	south	of	Russia,	has	now	
been	extended	to	the	entire	territory	of	the	Russian	Federation.	
It	is	an	inflated	political-military	project	of	the	Kremlin,	mobilis-
ing	society	 in	 the	 face	of	alleged	new	threats	 (illegal	migration,	
extremism,	 terrorism,	 cultural	 threats,	 cyber-crime,	 the	 fight	
against	informational	aggression	by	the	West).
The	political,	social	and	legal	status	of	neo-Cossackdom	remains	
undefined.	Its	organisations	and	associations	have	little	to	do	with	
either	the	‘troops’	or	the	NGO	third	sector,	or	the	folklore	and	re-
enactment	 societies	with	which	 they	are	 sometimes	associated.	
Their	basic	distinguishing	marks	are	their	control	by	the	Krem-
lin	and	the	exchange	of	mutual	benefits	(in	exchange	for	conces-
sions	and	contracts).	Paramilitary	associations	are	being	organ-
ised	 from	 the	 top	 down,	 which	 has	 changed	 the	 neo-Cossacks’	
motivations,	including	those	of	the	younger	generation.	For	them,	
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neo-Cossackdom	can	open	up	a	career	path,	because	the	other	al-
ternatives	are	blocked	off;	it	can	also	provide	a	stable	income.	The	
favourable	political	situation	also	attracts	radicals;	 these	can	be	
used	to	accomplish	various	objectives	of	the	Kremlin,	which	can	
always	cut	them	off	if	necessary.
In	this	series	of	political-military,	business,	historical	and	social	
projects,	the	neo-Cossacks	have	been	cast	in	the	role	of	auxiliaries	
to	the	ruling	corporation	of	power.	They	have	become	instrumen-
talised	as	a	multi-functional	tool	for	the	Kremlin.	Their	features	
are	listed	in	the	following	table:
Function Method of implementation
military
•	the organisational base of the civil and territorial de-
fence of the Russian Federation;
•	reserve personnel, in a state of permanent standby;
•	auxiliary formations of the border patrol;
•	volunteer forces in armed conflicts which Russia does 
not officially participate in;
•	cyber-warfare and informational warfare;
law & order
and repres-
sion
•	volunteer auxiliary police teams;
•	private security services for state and municipal facili-
ties;
•	security at mass events, Olympics and soccer champi-
onships;
•	interventions during opposition meetings;
•	checks on supermarkets for the sale of forbidden food 
imports;
economical
•	relieving the federal budget for security and defence by 
means of self-financing Cossack military associations;
•	production of food for the armed forces and other stra-
tegic consumers;
•	ensuring the food security of the Russian Federation;
•	Cossack entrepreneurship as a screen for businesses 
run by the institutions of force when not involved in 
combat;
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Function Method of implementation
political
•	strengthening Russian statehood;
•	disciplining national minorities; 
•	a tool to fight the opposition;
•	supporting the special services in their active engage-
ments; 
•	outposts of the ‘Russian world’ in countries of the ‘near 
and far abroad’;
social
•	the militarisation and military organisation of society;
•	the government’s social infrastructure;
•	the patriotic upbringing of youth and society in a spirit 
of service to the state;
•	the social factor in the fight against new threats (Islam-
ic fundamentalism, extremism, illegal migration, etc.);
•	volunteer patrols of the civil militia; 
•	preventing drug addiction, work with pathological and 
dysfunctional families;
cultural/
ideological
•	shaping a new civilisational identity for Russian soci-
ety; 
•	strengthening neo-imperial ideology (Cossacks as the 
vanguard in Russia’s Eurasian ideology);
•	an instrument of ‘defence’: the fight against Western 
values and the dissemination of so-called traditional 
conservative values, based on Orthodoxy;
decorative
•	participation in parades on Red Square and state cel-
ebrations (this mainly applies to the Kuban Honorary 
Troops);
•	support for regional initiatives and patriotic celebra-
tions;
•	providing security for the Orthodox Church and mon-
asteries, including the seat of the Patriarch;
•	dignifying the religious services of the Russian Ortho-
dox Church;
•	Cossack folklore as PR for Russia, e.g. national song and 
dance ensembles: the Kuban Cossack Choir, the Song 
and Dance Ensemble of the Don Cossacks of Rostov, the 
Stavropolye group, the Cossacks of Russia from Lipetsk, 
and others. 
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At	the	end,	it	is	worth	emphasising	that	the	present	relationship	
between	the	state	and	the	Cossacks	is	characterised	by	the	legal	
and	organisational	solutions	which	have	been	imposed	on	the	lat-
ter.	At	 the	propaganda	 level,	 it	 is	distinguished	by	an	ability	 to	
cooperate	in	strengthening	the	military	organisation	of	the	state	
and	 society.	 The	 Cossacks’	 militarised	 lifestyle	 is	 an	 excellent	
background	to	spectacular	informational	activity.	The	structure	
and	shape	of	the	so-called	Cossack	troops,	together	with	their	ev-
er-closer	approximation	to	military	standards,	allows	their	sys-
temic	integration	into	the	security	and	defence	systems,	which	is	
the	main	message	of	the	Strategy of the Russian Federation’s policy 
towards the Cossacks to 2020.	However,	 the	question	of	how	well	
the	development	of	the	neo-Cossacks	 is	managed,	as	well	as	the	
Putin	 system’s	 ability	 to	 generate	 new	 projects	 and	 corrective	
mechanisms	for	them,	remains	problematic.	Those	currently	be-
ing	implemented,	with	regard	to	the	new	strategic	objectives,	are	
merely	replicating	the	old	ideas,	and	thus	preserving	the	patholo-
gies	of	the	Russian	political-economic	system.
JOLANTA DARCzEWSKA
